The Dignity/Value Argument for the Justice of Hell

In an area of philosophy of religion and philosophical theology called the Problem of Hell, the eternity of Hell is thought to be unjust by some due to the fact that any crimes that human beings commit are finite and yet they are, for those who are damned, punished for an eternity in Hell. The punishment (which is infinite) does not fit the crime (which is finite) and so, the argument goes, Hell is unjust. There are a number of defenses and theodicies that have been offered by theologians and philosophers on behalf of the doctrine of Hell. One such defense is what we might call the “Infinite Dignity/Value” defense.

The basic idea is that while any crimes we commit will be merely finite offenses in and of themselves, they will ultimately be crimes against an infinite being (namely, God), a being with infinite dignity and value. And any crime committed against a being of infinite dignity and value is deserving of an infinite punishment and so is deserving of Hell. Historically, this line of reasoning was notably defended by St. Anselm of Canterbury (cf. Cur Deus Homo, I, XI-XV; XX-XI) and, on the Protestant side, by John Calvin (cf. Institutes of the Christian Religion, III, 25, 5). The argument can be formalized as follows:

1. A moral crime committed against an infinite being deserves infinite punishment.
2. Whatever is deserving of infinite punishment is deserving of Hell.
3. So, a moral crime committed against an infinite being is deserving of Hell (1, 2).
4. Every moral crime is a moral crime committed against an infinite being.
5. Therefore, every moral crime is deserving of Hell.

If sound, then the argument demonstrates the justice of Hell, since it establishes that every (moral) crime a human being might commit is deserving of Hell. Thus, the punishment does indeed fit the crime with respect to the damned in Hell. The key premise is the first premise. Why think that this is true? One idea is that a crime committed against a being will be deserving of punishment that is proportional to the dignity and value of that being.

For example, suppose that Smith kills his neighbor’s dog. Clearly, this is a crime deserving of punishment. Now, suppose that Jones kills his neighbor (a human being). Clearly, this is a crime deserving of greater punishment than Smith’s crime is. Why? The most plausible answer seems to be that a human being is of far greater dignity and value than a dog, and so a crime committed against a human being is deserving of greater punishment than the same crime committed against a dog. In a similar vein, a crime committed against an angel would be deserving of greater punishment than the same crime committed against a human being, since an angel is of greater dignity and value (at least by nature) than a human being (cf. Psalm 8:5). Now, consider God. Since God is of greater dignity and value than human beings and also angels, a crime against Him is deserving of greater punishment than that same crime committed against human beings or angels. And, since God is not just finitely greater in dignity and value than human beings and angels but infinitely so, a crime committed against God is deserving of infinite punishment. So, the first premise is seemingly established.

One problem with this line of argument, however, is that the conclusion seems incompatible with Catholic doctrine. Catholic theology distinguishes between mortal and venial sin (cf. 1 John 5:16-17). According to the Catechism of the Catholic Church, “Mortal sin destroys charity in the heart of man by a grave violation of God’s law; it turns man away from God, who is his ultimate end and his beatitude, by preferring an inferior good to him…’Mortal sin is sin whose object is grave matter and which is also committed with full knowledge and deliberate consent’” (CCC 1855, 1857). By contrast, “Venial sin allows charity to subsist, even though it offends and wounds it…venial sin does not break the covenant with God…’Venial sin does not deprive the sinner of sanctifying grace, friendship with God, charity, and consequently eternal happiness’” (CCC 1855, 1863). Furthermore, the Catechism teaches the following with respect to damnation: “God predestines no one to go to hell; for this, a willful turning away from God (a mortal sin) is necessary, and persistence in it until the end” (CCC 1037).

Thus, from (5), it would follow that venial sin is damnable, which seems incompatible with Catholic doctrine: “Venial sin neither destroys nor lessens the state of grace” (Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, pg. 283). John Calvin, who as aforementioned was a proponent of the present argument, was fully aware of, and accepted, this implication (cf. Institutes of the Christian Religion, II, 8, 59). One way to respond to this would be to suggest that while it is true that venial sin, like mortal sin, is deserving of Hell, nevertheless, God, in this order of providence, has determined to not punish venial sins with damnation. So, mortal sins damn, but venial sins do not. Catholic doctrine, therefore, is not violated. While this response has some plausibility, I do not think that it ultimately works since it would conflict with another Catholic doctrine. Catholic theology rejects Martin Luther’s doctrine of simul iustus et peccator (“at the same time righteous and sinner”). Our righteous standing before God is not purely forensic. Rather, when we are justified, we are infused with sanctifying grace that interiorly renews us and makes us a new creation. In virtue of this infused grace and along with it the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, we have a righteous standing before God and stand in a state of salvation. Justification is not a mere legal declaration whereby we are merely imputed with an external righteousness. As the Council of Trent taught,

[J]ustification is not merely the remission of sins, but also the sanctification and renewal of the inward man (Decree on Justification, Ch. VII).

If anyone shall say, that men are justified either by the sole imputation of the righteousness of Christ, or by the sole remission of sins, to the exclusion of the grace and the charity which is shed abroad in their hearts by the Holy Spirit [Rom. 5:5], and is inherent in them; or even that the grace, by which we are justified, is only the favor of God; let him be anathema (On Justification, Canon XI).

The reason that mortal sin is damning is that it destroys sanctifying grace. By contrast, the reason that venial sin is not damning is that it does not destroy sanctifying grace. Thus, the reason for the distinction between mortal and venial sin is ontological and not merely juridical. If we have sanctifying grace in our souls, then we are not deserving of damnation. Since, therefore, venial sin does not destroy sanctifying grace, it follows that venial sin cannot be deserving of damnation. Hence, the response presently under consideration fails. Not only are venial sins not in fact punished with damnation, they are also not even deserving of damnation. The following argument summarizes this reasoning:

1. Either venial sin destroys sanctifying grace or it does not.
2. If it does, then it is equivalent to mortal sin, i.e., the distinction between mortal and venial collapses.
3. If it does not, then venial sin is not deserving of infinite punishment.
4. There is a distinction between mortal and venial sin, i.e., they are not equivalent.
5. Therefore, venial sin is not deserving of infinite punishment.

We have thus arrived at the conclusion that (5) is false. But if (5) is false, then at least one of the premises of the argument must be false. Thus, at least one of (1), (2), or (4) must be false. (2) is clearly true. Hell just is infinite punishment. Hence, if something is worthy of eternal punishment, it is ipso facto worthy of Hell. (4) is also true, according to the teaching of Sacred Scripture and the Church. “Sin is an offense against God. ‘Against you, you alone, have I sinned, and done that which is evil in your sight’ [Ps. 51:4]” (CCC 1850). That leaves us with (1), which we earlier found to be very plausible. In light of all that has been presented up to this point, let us reexamine (1).

There is some ambiguity in (1). For, with respect to punishment, we can analyze it along two dimensions: duration and intensity. So, when (1) claims that a moral crime is deserving of infinite punishment, which dimension is in view? Suppose intensity is what is in view. In that case, a moral crime is deserving of a punishment of infinite intensity. The issue with this, as St. Thomas Aquinas points out, is that a punishment of an infinite intensity could not be borne by finite beings like ourselves. Such a punishment would result in annihilation, which is incompatible with the eternity of Hell (Summa Theologica, I-II, 87, 4; cf. Matthew 25:46). But if the punishment due is proportional to the dignity of the offended party, then it seems like a punishment of infinite intensity would be due, since the intensity of a punishment should increase as the gravity of the crime increases. On the supposition of punishments being proportioned to the dignity of the offended, then, a punishment of infinite intensity is called for. Since, therefore, we cannot be meted out a punishment of infinite intensity, it follows that punishments for crimes must not be proportioned to the dignity of the offended party. Instead, according to St. Thomas, punishments are proportioned to the degree to which a crime deviates from the moral order, in particular from our Last End, which is God Himself. Now, in this respect, the distinction between mortal and venial sin is clearly seen. As St. Thomas explains,

[S]in incurs a debt of punishment through disturbing an order. But the effect remains so long as the cause remains. Wherefore so long as the disturbance of the order remains the debt of punishment must needs remain also. Now disturbance of an order is sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable: because a defect which destroys the principle is irreparable, whereas if the principle be saved, defects can be repaired by virtue of that principle. For instance, if the principle of sight be destroyed, sight cannot be restored except by Divine power; whereas, if the principle of sight be preserved, while there arise certain impediments to the use of sight, these can be remedied by nature or by art. Now in every order there is a principle whereby one takes part in that order. Consequently if a sin destroys the principle of the order whereby man’s will is subject to God, the disorder will be such as to be considered in itself, irreparable, although it is possible to repair it by the power of God. Now the principle of this order is the last end, to which man adheres by charity. Therefore whatever sins turn man away from God, so as to destroy charity, considered in themselves, incur a debt of eternal punishment (Summa Theologica, I-II, 87, 3).

As stated above (A. 3), a sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, in so far as it causes an irreparable disorder in the order of Divine justice, through being contrary to the very principle of that order, viz. the last end. Now it is evident that in some sins there is disorder indeed, but such as not to involve contrariety in respect of the last end, but only in respect of things referable to the end, in so far as one is too much or too little intent on them without prejudicing the order to the last end: as, for instance, when a man is too fond of some temporal thing, yet would not offend God for its sake, by breaking one of His commandments. Consequently such sins do not incur everlasting, but only temporal punishment (ibid., I-II, 87, 5).

Thus, sins that do not cause us to completely diverge from our Last End are not deserving of infinite punishment, even with respect to duration. Therefore, (1) turns out to be false. Hence, the “Infinite Dignity/Value” defense against the Problem of Hell, as formulated above, is unsound. Nevertheless, perhaps there are other formulations of the argument that are sound. The key requirement that any such formulation will have to fulfill, however, is that the distinction between mortal and venial sin is preserved.

In connection with what has been discussed in this post, another interesting issue to consider is the nature of the first sin committed by Adam and Eve. According to Catholic doctrine, Adam and Eve were elevated to the supernatural state of grace by being infused with sanctifying grace—referred to in their case as original righteousness—when they were created (cf. Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, pg. 113). Now, since venial sin does not destroy sanctifying grace, it follows that Adam and Eve’s sin of disobedience in the Garden had to have been a mortal sin. But suppose the first sin had been merely a venial sin. What would the consequence of this have been? A consideration of this question will have to wait for a future post.