Lying in Extraordinary Circumstances: Some Biblical Considerations

Here are some thoughts on the morality of lying, particularly in extraordinary circumstances. Lying, as classically defined by St. Augustine, "consists in speaking a falsehood with the intention of deceiving" (CCC 2482, quoting St. Augustine). And, according to Augustine, lying is intrinsically wrong, i.e., it is never permissible in any circumstances: “It seems to me, however, that every lie is a sin, albeit there is a great difference depending on the intention and the topic of the lie” (Enchiridion, Ch. VI, par. 18). The classic problem case for this conception of lying is the Nazis-at-the-door scenario. You are living in Germany during the Jewish Holocaust. You are hiding Jews in your attic to protect them. Some Nazis knock at your door and ask you if you are hiding Jews in your house. What to do? On the one hand, you might think that lying is intrinsically wrong, and lying consists in speaking a falsehood with the intention of deceiving. So, you reason that you cannot licitly lie to the Nazis (i.e., you cannot licitly speak a falsehood to the Nazis with the intention of deceiving them). So, telling the Nazis that you do not have Jews in your house seems like it’s off the table. On the other hand, if you tell the Nazis the truth, they will arrest the Jews and send them off to a concentration camp. Needless to say, this would be very bad. So, we seemingly have a serious moral dilemma. One possibility to explore is to scrutinize the Augustinian conception of lying. There are substantive philosophical arguments both for and against the Augustinian view, but for this post I will restrict myself to some biblical considerations.