A Painful Personite Problem for Stage Theory

All the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players; they have their exits and their entrances, and one man in his time plays many parts.

— William Shakespeare

I. Introduction

Mark Johnston has argued that four-dimensionalist theories of persistence have “surprising, repellent and perhaps even disastrous, implications for our ordinary moral outlook.”[1] In response, Alex Kaiserman has argued that these disastrous implications afflict only one kind of four-dimensionalism, namely, worm theory, but that they do not afflict the alternative stage theory.[2] In this post, I argue that given some plausible premises having to do with pain and moral status, stage theory does not in fact escape the problem raised by Johnston.

Williams on the Passage of Time

I. Introduction

In his paper “The Myth of Passage,” Donald C. Williams argues against the passage of time (which, according to our former vice president, has great significance) as it is understood by many proponents of the A-theory of time.[1] One argument in particular that Williams offers is that there is no sense to be made of the notion that time itself moves. Given this, Williams argues that there is no such thing as the passage of time. He further argues that if the A-series of time exists, then there is the passage of time. He concludes that the A-series does not exist. In this post, I will give a reconstruction of Williams’ argument and offer an evaluation of it. In particular, I will offer criticisms of Williams’ argument as well as ways in which Williams can respond to such criticisms. Ultimately, however, I conclude that Williams’ argument does not succeed.

An Anti-Verificationist Critique of Einstein’s Argument Against Absolute Simultaneity

I. Introduction

In his classic book Relativity: The Special and the General Theory, Albert Einstein gave a famous argument for the relativity of simultaneity, i.e., for the thesis that the simultaneity/non-simultaneity of two events in time at different locations in space is relative to the reference frame that the events are observed in and that not all reference frames will be in agreement with respect to which events are simultaneous/non-simultaneous. Further, Einstein argues that all reference frames are equally valid and that the notion of frame-transcendent simultaneity is meaningless. Einstein concludes from all of this that there is no relation of absolute simultaneity. In this post, I shall give a detailed summary and logical reconstruction of Einstein’s argumentation and then offer a critique of it. I will argue that Einstein’s conclusion that there is no relation of absolute simultaneity relies on the logical positivist principle of verification. Insofar as this principle is false (as is widely acknowledged), Einstein’s argument fails to show that there is no relation of absolute simultaneity and is thus unsound. As will be seen, this failure has some important upshots.

Logical Positivism's Ayer Ball Against Theology

Logical positivism was a philosophical movement that began in the 1920s in the Vienna Circle. The philosopher A.J. Ayer (1910-1989) was instrumental in popularizing logical positivism in the English-speaking world. His most famous and systematic exposition and defense of logical positivism was given in his book Language, Truth and Logic. At the heart of logical positivism is the principle of verification (also known as the verification principle, verifiability criterion, principle of verifiability, the verification criterion of meaning, etc.). The principle of verification is a criterion for determining whether or not a sentence is meaningful, where a sentence is meaningful just in case it succeeds in expressing a proposition. A major motivation of the principle is to enable us to distinguish between meaningful statements of logic and natural science and (according to logical positivists) meaningless statements of metaphysics, ethics, theology, and aesthetics. The principle tries to achieve this goal by dividing all propositions into two categories: (1) analytic propositions and (2) empirically verifiable propositions.

On an Argument from Divine Simplicity to the Eternality of Creation

Are you toying with me and turning me around in an impossible maze of logic? For now you enter by the way you left, and then you leave by the way you entered. Or are you weaving some wonderful web of divine simplicity?

— Boethius

The doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) holds that God is absolutely metaphysically simple. In Catholic theology, this doctrine has the status of a formal dogma as defined by Lateran IV and reaffirmed by Vatican I. The DDS is commonly understood to entail that everything in God (i.e., everything intrinsic to God) is identical to God (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, ST I.28.2 ad 1).

Aristotle on Primary and Secondary Substance in the Categories

Aristotle lays out his understanding of the difference between primary and secondary substance in the Categories. In this post, I will explain both Aristotle’s understanding of substance in general as he lays it out in the Categories and his understanding of the difference between primary and secondary substance in particular.

The Fine-Tuning Argument and the Gap Problem: Some Objections Considered

I. Introduction

The fine-tuning argument (FTA) is an argument for an Intelligent Designer of the physical universe. The basic idea is that physicists have discovered that a number of the fundamental constants that show up in the laws of physics (e.g., the cosmological constant and the fine structure constant) are remarkably fine-tuned for the existence of biological life.[1] What such “fine-tuning” amounts to is that there is a wide range of reasonable values that these constants could take on but a comparatively narrow—very narrow, in fact—range of life-permitting values, that is, values that would make the existence of biological life possible. As it happens, it is an empirical discovery that the values these constants have in fact taken on fall within the life-permitting range. Had this not been the case, biological life would not have been possible. Given the wide range of possible, reasonable values and the narrow range of life-permitting values, it is highly improbable that the constants should have taken on life-permitting values and thus highly improbable that there would be biological life. Yet here we are.

God as a Hypothesis: A Response to Edward Feser

On his blog, Edward Feser argues that it is illegitimate to think of God as a hypothesis (Edward Feser: Is God’s existence a “hypothesis”?) I disagree. To begin, it is important to attend to what Feser means by "hypothesis." He adopts the following definitions, which he sees as being complementary to one another:

Hypothesis:

• [A] conditional or provisional explanation of observed facts or of their connection with each other; a tentative explanation suggestive of further experiment and verification.
• As used in the natural sciences, a predictive judgment about an empirical event that will occur under a describable set of conditions.  (Hypotheses are sometimes generated by more general theories; if the predicted events in fact occur, the hypotheses are said to be confirmed, and this in turn provides additional rational support for the theories in question.)

Trouble in Paradise: Evil, Evidence, and the Problem of Paradise

In the previous post, I considered arguments for the conclusion that evil is evidence for the existence of God. In this post, I want to consider an argument for the conclusion that evil is evidence against the existence of God. The argument is defended by appeal to what is known in the academic literature as the problem of paradise, which Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne, and Yoaav Isaacs introduce as follows:

Problem of Paradise: Consider a world of pleasures with no pain, of goods with no evil— an Eden. If the world were like that, then we think that would constitute a fairly overwhelming argument for the existence of God. In such an Edenic world, atheists would face the problem of paradise. But if the probability of God is higher given the complete absence of evil (in an Edenic world), then the presence of evil (as in our world) must reduce the probability of God. Put otherwise: if the absence of evil is evidence for God, then the presence of evil is evidence against the existence of God ("Evil and Evidence," pg. 5-6).

The Problem of Evil and the Moral Argument for God: A Corrective to Popular Apologetics

"Surprisingly, though, evil is actually evidence for God, not against Him." — Greg Koukl

"True evil is evidence for God’s existence." — J. Warner Wallace

"But because there is evil and because theism better predicts or explains those things needed to make sense of evil, then evil provides great evidence for the existence of God." — Pat Flynn

"While the existence of evil is a serious problem, it is an even more serious problem for atheists because the existence of evil is only further evidence for God’s existence." — Daniel King

"Again, the problem of evil—the leading anti-theistic argument—turns out to be an argument for God’s existence." — Paul Copan

An Argument From Reason Against Mereological Nihilism

Mereological nihilism is the metaphysical thesis that composite objects do not exist. Formally, letting P denote the parthood relational predicate:

Pxy ↔ x = y.

When combined with materialism (as is often done), mereological nihilism entails that the only things that exist are physical simples (such as, for example, quarks and electrons). What are taken by common sense to be composite objects (sometimes referred to by philosophers as "common objects") are, according to the mereological nihilist, really nothing but various arrangements of these simples. So, for instance, a chair is nothing but a collection of simples arranged chair-wise. Similarly, a rock is nothing but a collection of simples arranged rock-wise. And so on. The reality of metaphysical substances is denied. With that being said, some forms of mereological nihilism are less radical than others. For example, the metaphysician Peter van Inwagen holds to a restricted form of mereological nihilism that allows for the existence of composite living things (e.g., plants, animals, and humans), while holding everything else to be nothing but arrangements of simples.

In this post, I want to focus on the most extreme form of mereological nihilism: the thesis that there are no composite objects whatsoever, be they living or otherwise. I also will be assuming strict materialism (i.e., to be is to be physical). I shall argue that mereological nihilism thus understood—what we might call strong materialist mereological nihilism—is incompatible with the reality of rationality and valid logical inference.

Successive Addition, Supertasks, Grim Reapers, and the Kalam Cosmological Argument

In the previous post, I considered William Lane Craig's first philosophical argument for the second premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument, viz. The universe began to exist. In this post, I want to consider Craig's second philosophical argument for this same premise. Additionally, I will consider the Grim Reaper Paradox and its application to proving this premise.

Hilbert's Hotel, Set Theory, Presentism, and the Kalam Cosmological Argument

The Kalam Cosmological Argument is an argument for the existence of God that is broken up into two stages. The first stage of the argument tries to show that the universe has a cause and can be formulated as follows:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

The second stage of the argument then attempts to derive various of the divine attributes from the cause of the universe, thus implying that the cause in question is plausibly taken to be God as classically conceived. Perhaps the most prominent defender of the Kalam today is the philosopher William Lane Craig. Craig typically offers two philosophical arguments in support of the second premise of the first stage of the argument (see the syllogism above). In this post, I want to examine Craig's first philosophical argument.

A Libertarian Case Against Abortion

In celebration of the overturning of Roe v. Wade, I thought I would share an (unpublished) essay I wrote against the moral permissibility of abortion a few years ago. At the time, I was somewhat of a libertarian (this is no longer the case). Consequently, I approached the issue through a libertarian lens. If there is an apologetic advantage to this, it is that pro-choice arguments are, I think, strongest when evaluated against a libertarian backdrop. Thus, the essay seeks to refute the pro-choice position on its home turf, so to speak. Anyway, without further ado, the essay can be accessed HERE.

Kant's First Antinomy: The Beginning of the Universe

The philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) famously argued that reason is not capable of answering the question of whether the universe began to exist. Kant sought to show this by demonstrating that both the proposition that the universe began to exist and its negation (i.e., the universe did not begin to exist) admit of incontrovertible arguments in their favor, thus implying that reason leads to the conclusion that a proposition (what Kant calls the “thesis”) and its negation (what Kant calls the “antithesis”) are both true. But by the principle of non-contradiction, a proposition and its negation cannot both be true. Kant refers to such paradoxes as antinomies of pure reason. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant identifies four such antinomies, the first of which is the one presently under discussion. In trying to answer such cosmological questions by way of pure reason, reason itself, as Kant puts it, “soon falls into such contradictions that it is constrained, in this cosmological field, to desist from any such pretensions” (Critique of Pure Reason, Bk. II, Ch. II, pg. 385). Given the present antinomy, we must conclude that reason itself is bankrupt with respect to answering the question of whether the universe began to exist, even though the question must of logical necessity have an objective answer. As Kant writes,

Lying in Extraordinary Circumstances: Some Biblical Considerations

Here are some thoughts on the morality of lying, particularly in extraordinary circumstances. Lying, as classically defined by St. Augustine, "consists in speaking a falsehood with the intention of deceiving" (CCC 2482, quoting St. Augustine). And, according to Augustine, lying is intrinsically wrong, i.e., it is never permissible in any circumstances: “It seems to me, however, that every lie is a sin, albeit there is a great difference depending on the intention and the topic of the lie” (Enchiridion, Ch. VI, par. 18). The classic problem case for this conception of lying is the Nazis-at-the-door scenario. You are living in Germany during the Jewish Holocaust. You are hiding Jews in your attic to protect them. Some Nazis knock at your door and ask you if you are hiding Jews in your house. What to do? On the one hand, you might think that lying is intrinsically wrong, and lying consists in speaking a falsehood with the intention of deceiving. So, you reason that you cannot licitly lie to the Nazis (i.e., you cannot licitly speak a falsehood to the Nazis with the intention of deceiving them). So, telling the Nazis that you do not have Jews in your house seems like it’s off the table. On the other hand, if you tell the Nazis the truth, they will arrest the Jews and send them off to a concentration camp. Needless to say, this would be very bad. So, we seemingly have a serious moral dilemma. One possibility to explore is to scrutinize the Augustinian conception of lying. There are substantive philosophical arguments both for and against the Augustinian view, but for this post I will restrict myself to some biblical considerations.

Omnipotence, Uniqueness, and the Kalam Cosmological Argument

The Kalam Cosmological Argument is an argument for the existence of God that is broken up into two stages. The first stage purports to establish the existence of a transcendent First Cause of the universe, and the second stage purports to establish that this First Cause strongly resembles God as classically conceived. The foremost contemporary champion of the Kalam is the philosopher William Lane Craig. The first stage of the argument is commonly formulated by Craig in the form of the following syllogism:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

In the second stage, Craig undergoes a conceptual analysis in which he derives various of the traditional divine attributes that are necessarily possessed by the First Cause. According to Craig, the overall conclusion of the Kalam is that “an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful” (“The Kalam Cosmological Argument,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, pp. 196). In what follows, I will assume the general soundness of the Kalam argument. The interested reader can read my fairly lengthy treatment and defense of the Kalam argument here.