An Argument Against the Possibility of Multiple Omnipotent Beings and Some Implications for the Trinity and Incarnation

Argument: Suppose there are two omnipotent beings G1 and G2. Now, suppose that G1 wills that Earth gets created and that G2 wills that Earth does not get created. Who “wins”? On the one hand, Earth should get created since G1 wills it, G1 is omnipotent, and the creation of Earth is logically possible. On the other hand, Earth should not get created since G2 wills it, G2 is omnipotent, and Earth not being created is logically possible. The answer therefore seems to be that Earth gets created and Earth does not get created, a flat contradiction. Such a state of affairs, therefore, is impossible. And yet, such a state of affairs seems like it would be possible if there really were two omnipotent beings (since it seems possible that the two beings could will such mutually contradictory states of affairs). Hence, it must not be the case that there are two omnipotent beings. Even more strongly, it must not be possible for there to be two omnipotent beings. And more generally, it must not be possible for there to be any number of omnipotent beings greater than one, since the same paradox can be derived no matter how many more omnipotent beings we keep adding beyond two. The argument can be formalized as follows:

An Incarnational Problem with Molinism?

The dogma of the Incarnation holds that the Divine Logos “became flesh and dwelt among us” (John 1:14). To elaborate, the Second Person of the Trinity, the eternal Son of God, took on a complete human nature in such a way that He was truly God and truly man (Christ). This mysterious and sublime union is referred to in theology as the Hypostatic Union. To properly understand this great mystery, we must neither divide the person (which would be the heresy of Nestorianism) nor confuse the natures (which would be the heresy of Monophysitism). In other words, there is but one person in the incarnated Christ, the Divine Logos; and there are two complete and distinct natures in the incarnated Christ, Divine and human. Moreover, we must recognize that in the Incarnated Christ, due to the completeness of both natures, there are two wills (the Divine will and a human will), rather than just one will (which would be the heresy of Monothelitism).

In this reflection, I want to focus on the following doctrine pertaining to the incarnated Christ and how it creates a pressing puzzle for Molinism:

“Christ did not merely not sin in actuality, but He also could not sin. [Sent. fidei proxima.]” (Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, pg. 184)