Thomism, Molinism, and God's Universal Salvific Will

One of the central disputes between Thomists and Molinists is over whether actual grace is intrinsically efficacious (Thomism) or extrinsically efficacious (Molinism). The late, great Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange explains this difference as follows:

According to Molinism, grace is efficacious only because God foresees that man will consent, whereas, for St. Thomas, “God indeed moves the will immutably, because of the efficacy of the moving power which cannot fail; but because of the nature of the will that is moved, which is indifferently disposed toward various things, it is not necessitated but remains free” (God, His Existence and His Nature, Vol. II pg. 516).

Actual grace is a transient prompting or impulse from God that moves us to perform a salutary act, i.e., an act that is conducive to salvation and sanctification. This is in contrast to habitual grace, which is a permanent disposition in the soul. With respect to actual grace, there is a distinction between sufficient grace and efficacious grace. Sufficient grace gives the real power to perform a salutary act but without actually producing the act, whereas efficacious grace actually produces the act as well. Both Thomists and Molinists are in full agreement thus far. The disagreement is over the nature of the distinction between sufficient grace and efficacious grace and what makes efficacious grace efficacious. For Thomists, there is a real distinction between sufficient grace and efficacious grace, whereas for Molinists there is merely a logical distinction. Thomists hold that sufficient grace and efficacious grace are numerically distinct, and that efficacious grace is efficacious of itself and infallibly produces the salutary act (intrinsically efficacious grace). Molinists, by contrast, hold that sufficient grace and efficacious grace are numerically identical, and that efficacious grace is sufficient grace that is made efficacious by the consent of our will (extrinsically efficacious grace). Both Thomists and Molinists affirm free will, but Thomists put more emphasis on grace, whereas Molinists put more emphasis on free will. Naturally, Thomists accuse Molinists of compromising the efficacy of grace in favor of free will, and Molinists accuse Thomists of compromising free will in favor of the efficacy of grace.

My aim in this post is not to settle the debate but rather to simply consider one Molinist argument against the Thomist doctrine of intrinsically efficacious grace, which Molina himself suggests in the following passage:

In fact, if the method of predestining some adults and not others was one that has been gleaned from the theory of these authors with their predeterminations [i.e., if the Thomist view of predestination is true], then I do not see in what sense it is true that God wills all human beings to be saved if they themselves do not prevent it, or in what sense it is true and not fictitious that all human beings without exception have been created by God for eternal life. Nor do I see how God could justifiably reproach the nonpredestinate for not living in a pious and holy manner and for not attaining eternal life; indeed, I do not see how it is true that God has placed human beings in the hand of their own counsel, so that they might direct their actions as they will [cf. Sirach 15:14-17]. To the contrary, given this method of predestination and predeterminations, the freedom of the created faculty of choice perishes, and the justice and goodness of God with respect to the reprobate are greatly obfuscated and obscured. Thus, this theory is neither pious nor in any way safe from the point of view of the faith (On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia, Disp. 53, Part 2, par. 29, pg. 236).

Based on this passage from Molina, one argument against the doctrine of intrinsically efficacious grace that suggests itself is as follows:

1. God desires the salvation of all people (i.e., the doctrine of God’s universal salvific will is true).
2. If the doctrine of intrinsically efficacious grace is true, then God can save all people.
3. If God desires the salvation of all people and He can save all people, then all people will be saved, i.e., universalism is true.
4. Universalism is false.
5. Therefore, the doctrine of intrinsically efficacious grace is false.

All Catholics are committed to premises 1 and 4. Thomists are committed to premise 2. Hence, to avoid the conclusion, Thomists must reject premise 3. What follows is a possible back-and-forth exchange between Thomists and Molinists with respect to the soundness of this argument.

Start of dialogue.

Thomist: We must distinguish between desiring something and intending something. A father may not desire to punish his child but may nevertheless intend to do so because such punishment is what the child deserves for his bad behavior, and it is good for the child in that the punishment can facilitate behavioral reform. St. Thomas explains this in terms of a distinction between God’s antecedent will and His consequent will as follows:

The words of the Apostle, God will have all men to be saved [1 Tim. 2:4], etc., can be…understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent, but to the things willed. To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; and that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of the murderer, but in a qualified manner he would still will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place (ST I, 19, 6, ad. 1).

Thus, premise 3 is false. Just because, all else being equal, God desires the salvation of all (antecedent will), does not mean that God intends the salvation of all (consequent will). As Garrigou-Lagrange teaches, “By His antecedent will, God wills to save all men (for it is good that all be saved); by His consequent will, He wills efficaciously, all things taken into consideration, to save the elect” (Predestination, pg. 231). And if God does not intend the salvation of all, then His being able to save all is moot with respect to universalism. At the very least, premise 3 cannot be proven to be true. In order to know that it is true, we would have to know not just the desire but the intention of God. 1 Timothy 2:4 demonstrates God’s desire, but it does not necessarily demonstrate His intent. “For who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor?” (Romans 11:34; cf. Isaiah 40:13-14).

Molinist: The only reason someone would intend other than what is desired is if there is an overriding reason for doing so, or if there is a barrier to doing what is desired. One potential barrier to God intending to save all people is that His perfect justice must be satisfied. It would be unjust to save people who deserve punishment without making requisite satisfaction. However, this barrier is removed by the atonement. Christ’s sacrifice is sufficient for the forgiveness of all sins. For the sacrifice to take effect, however, a consent of the will in turning to God in faith for forgiveness is required.

But if intrinsically efficacious grace is true, then God can efficaciously move any human will to consent to His offer of forgiveness and reconciliation. So, God could move all people to faith and repentance by His efficacious grace, and His justice is fully satisfied by Christ’s atoning sacrifice. Thus, this alleged barrier to God intending the salvation of all dissolves on the presupposition of intrinsically efficacious grace. By contrast, on the presupposition of extrinsically efficacious grace, it may be that someone will always resist the sufficient grace given and thus render the grace inefficacious despite God’s desire to the contrary. The Molinist position, therefore, seems to be in a better position than the Thomist one in this respect. Without this barrier, then, what overriding reason could God have for not intending to save all people?

Thomist: One possible overriding reason is given by St. Paul:

So then he has mercy upon whomever he wills, and he hardens the heart of whomever he wills. You will say to me then, “Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will?” But who are you, a man, to answer back to God? Will what is molded say to its molder, “Why have you made me thus?” Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for beauty and another for menial use? What if God, desiring to show his wrath and to make known his power, has endured with much patience the vessels of wrath made for destruction, in order to make known the riches of his glory for the vessels of mercy, which he has prepared beforehand for glory…? (Romans 9:18-23).

St. Thomas explains this as follows:

The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God’s goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above (Q. 22, A. 2). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom He reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying (Rom. ix. 22, 23): What if God, willing to show His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known, endured, [that is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory (ST I, 23, 5, ad. 3; cf. Predestination, pg. 207).

To summarize, God manifests His goodness in His creation. Now, God’s goodness is simple, complete, and undivided. By the doctrine of divine simplicity, God is His goodness, is His mercy, is His justice, is His love, etc. (cf. ST I, 13, 4; 1 John 4:8). So, God’s mercy and justice are both aspects of God’s goodness and are identified with each other in the essence of God—though they are conceptually distinct when we, as finite beings, contemplate God. Mercy and justice are not identical, however, in created beings. Hence, if God is to manifest His goodness as completely as possible in creation, then it would be immensely fitting for Him to manifest His mercy and His justice in creation. Hence, it would be immensely fitting for God to manifest His supreme mercy in pardoning some sinners and to manifest His supreme justice in punishing other sinners.

Molinist: It seems like on the Thomist view God predestines and reprobates in a symmetrical manner. God chooses who will be saved and who will be damned and irresistibly impels the elect to salvation and the reprobate to damnation. And this seems to be a manifest violation of divine justice and smacks of the Calvinist doctrine of double predestination, which is surely incompatible with God's universal salvific will and was condemned by the Council of Trent:

If anyone shall say, that it is not in the power of man to make his ways evil, but that God worketh the works that are evil as well as those that are good, not by permission only, but properly, and of himself, in such wise that the treason of Judas be no less his own proper work than the calling of Paul; let him be anathema (On Justification, Canon VI).

If anyone shall say, that the grace of justification only befalleth those who are predestined unto life; but that all others who are called, are called indeed, but receive not grace, as being, by the divine power, predestined unto evil; let him be anathema (ibid., Canon XVII).

Thomist: It is very important to stress that Thomism emphatically rejects the Calvinist doctrine of double predestination. God does not unconditionally damn people but rather only conditionally damns on the supposition of mortal sin, and He permits the commission of mortal sin (and sin in general) for a greater good, a good whose existence presupposes the evil of sin. As St. Thomas explains,

Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin (ST I, 23, 3).

God is not the cause of sin; rather, He merely permits it in view of a greater good: “As for you, you meant evil against me; but God meant it for good” (Genesis 50:20). By contrast, Calvin explicitly rejects the distinction between God’s willing versus merely permitting evil (cf. Institutes of the Christian Religion I, 18; III, 23, 8.). Furthermore, God gives to everyone the real power of coming to salvation, which is to say, God gives everyone sufficient, though not necessarily efficacious, grace. God gives efficacious grace to the elect (i.e., the saved) and merely sufficient grace to the reprobate (i.e., the damned). Thus, the saved have only God to praise for their salvation, since the grace they are given is of itself efficacious and gives rise to their free consent rather than relying on said consent for its efficacy, and the damned have only themselves to blame for their damnation, since they resist by their own free will the sufficient grace they have been given. As St. Thomas explains:

Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated cannot obtain [efficacious] grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility; but only conditional impossibility: as was said above (Q. 19, A. 3), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet by a conditional necessity, which does not do away with liberty of choice. Whence, although anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire [efficacious] grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt (ST I, 23, 3, ad. 3).

And as Garrigou-Lagrange explains:

The Divine refusal of the efficacious grace of conversion (denegation divina gratae, vel subtraction gratiae) is a punishment that presupposes at least an initial fault (a resistance to prevenient sufficient grace). Therefore, this Divine refusal (or, this Divine subtraction) must be distinguished from the Divine permission of this fault. To confuse the one with the other would be to admit the principle undergirding Calvinism (The Sense of Mystery, pg. 253-254).

Molinist: The Thomist understanding of election and reprobation seems unjust. For both the elect and the reprobate are equally sinners: “For there is no distinction; since all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God” (Romans 3:22-23). Yet God saves the elect and does not save the reprobate. God is giving unequal things to equal parties, which is unjust. God's decision seems arbitrary and hence incompatible with a genuine universal salvific will.

Thomist: St. Thomas answers this objection as follows:

Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: Take what is thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will? (Matth. xx. 14, 15)” (ST I, 23, 5, ad. 3).

God does not owe sinners salvific grace. Hence, if He gives to some and not to others, there is no infringement of justice on His part. “All these are inspired by one and the same Spirit, who apportions to each one individually as he wills” (1 Corinthians 12:11).

Molinist: Even if the Thomist understanding of predestination does not violate God's perfect justice, it seems that it does violate God's perfect love. For to love is to will the good of the other. To love perfectly, therefore, is to will the perfect good of the other. Now, the perfect good for a human being is eternal beatitude with God. Hence, since God is perfectly loving, He would will for every human being to have eternal beatitude with Him. If, therefore, God is able to save everyone (as He is given the Thomist doctrine of intrinsically efficacious grace) and He chooses not to do so, this could only be because He imperfectly loves those whom He reprobates. But God cannot imperfectly love because He is love itself (cf. 1 John 4:8). Therefore, it must be the case that it is not within God's power (given human free will) to guarantee the salvation all (as is evident by the fact that universalism is false and God wills for all to be saved), and this can only be the case if the doctrine of intrinsically efficacious grace is false. Therefore, the doctrine of intrinsically efficacious grace must be false.

Thomist: There is a sense in which God loves all of His creatures equally, but there is also a sense in which He doesn't. St. Thomas explains this as follows:

Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the part of the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God does not love some things more than others, because He loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In another way on the part of the good itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God loves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things...no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another (ST I, 20, 3).

The very last statement is a formulation of the principle of predilection, which is well founded in Sacred Scripture (cf. 1 Corinthians 4:7). Insofar as something has more good than another, it is loved more by God, and this is because God's love is the cause of goodness in things. Now, Peter was clearly better (had more goodness) than Judas. Hence, Peter was loved more than Judas. To avoid this conclusion, the Molinist objector would have to either reject the analysis of love as willing the good of the other that is presupposed in his objection, or he would have to reject the principle of predilection. By taking the first horn of the dilemma, the objector does away with his own objection. By taking the second horn, the objector would be in opposition to the teaching of Sacred Scripture. Hence, the objector must accept the conclusion: God loved Peter more than Judas. Now, since God is perfectly loving, it must therefore be the case that this fact is compatible with God loving some persons more than others and willing greater good for some persons than for others. Therefore, the Molinist objection fails. God, though perfectly loving, can love the elect more than the reprobate. As St. Thomas explains (with respect to God's consequent will),

God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good—namely, eternal life—He is said to hate or reprobate them (ST I, 23, 3, ad. 1; cf. Malachi 1:2-3, Romans 9:13).

Molinist: It seems like sufficient grace from the Thomist perspective is not truly sufficient. For sufficient grace on the Thomist understanding only gives the power of acting without actually producing the salutary act. Only efficacious grace actually produces the salutary act. Hence, if a person is given only sufficient grace, then he cannot in fact perform a salutary act. Therefore, it seems that sufficient grace isn’t really sufficient after all. Consequently, God would be commanding the impossible with respect to those whom He merely gives sufficient grace, and this is a violation of His justice and wisdom. A further consequence is that those to whom God gives merely sufficient grace would not even have the real ability to come unto salvation, and this seems incompatible with God having a genuine universal salvific will.

Thomist: To say that sufficient grace doesn't truly give someone the power to perform the salutary act because it does not actually produce the act is like saying that because a sleeping person does not actually see whilst asleep, he does not truly have the power of sight. Even though a sleeping man cannot actually see, he has the power to see, and this power can be actualized upon waking. Similarly, a person to whom sufficient grace has been given has the power to perform a salutary act, and this power is actualized by efficacious grace, which is given to him provided he does not resist the sufficient grace he has been given. There is, to be sure, still a mystery in this. For as Garrigou-Lagrange explains,

All Thomists agree in saying that, if a man did not resist sufficient grace, he would receive the efficacious grace required to enable him to do his duty. But here again is the mystery: for to resist sufficient grace is an evil that can come only from us; whereas not to resist sufficient grace is a good that cannot be solely the result of our action, but one which must come from God who is the source of all good (Predestination, pg. 239).

Why, then, does God permit some to resist sufficient grace whilst He empowers others to not resist? We must answer with St. Augustine: "Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err" (In Ioan., tract. 26; cf. The Sense of Mystery, pg. 254-255).

Molinist: The suggestion that while God desires to save all, He might also desire to exhibit His retributive justice by punishing some who are deserving of such punishment seems to lead us to say something logically problematic. Suppose, as is suggested, that God both desires to save all and desires to pass over some in order to manifest His justice. The problem is that the second desideratum of God implies that God does not, after all, desire the salvation of all. So, God both desires the salvation of all and does not desire the salvation of all. These are contradictory desires and so are such that God can’t sensibly possess them both. So, this alleged reason for a difference in what God desires versus what He intends vis-à-vis the salvation of all dissolves on pain of incoherence.

Thomist: It seems like what is being said is that God desires p and desires q, where q entails ~p. And this is supposed to imply that God desires both p and ~p. But this is only true if desire is closed under entailment, i.e., if I desire p and p implies q, then I desire q. And this seems manifestly false. Someone could have two desires that are ultimately in conflict. I might desire to eat potato chips but also desire to avoid high fat foods. Clearly these desires are in conflict. But it isn’t incoherent to nevertheless have both of these desires. So, God could have two desires that are in conflict. This is not inherently problematic. Suppose that God intends one desire rather than the other (only being able to intend one, since the two desires are at odds with one another). We might wonder about God’s reason for intending the one desire rather than the other, but there is no reason a priori to think that God could have no such reason. Thomists would be content to say that God’s decision is a mystery to us. It is, as Garrigou-Lagrange would say, the mystery of the divine predilection (cf. The Sense of Mystery, pg. 250, 254-255). Indeed, St. Paul himself seems to appeal to mystery in his discussion of God’s providence and election: “O the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgements and how inscrutable his ways!” (Romans 11:33).

Molinist: The appeal to mystery is unsatisfactory. It is an "anchor of ignorance," as Molina put it. Elaborating further, Molina wrote:

[T]here is absolutely no reason we Catholics should take refuge in ignorance in such a public way, with no small disgrace on our part and with a lessening of the reputation of the dogmas of the faith in the eyes of unbelievers, especially since neither the holy Fathers, nor St. Thomas, nor any others among the leading Scholastics flee to such a refuge (On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia, Disp. 53, Part 2, par. 20, pg. 228).

Thomist: One of the key takeaways of this dialogue should be that mystery is not contradiction. The objector has failed to show a genuine contradiction between the doctrine of intrinsically efficacious grace and the doctrine of God's universal salvific will. As far as mystery being unsatisfactory, perhaps it is. But the fundamental obscurity underlying this issue is, as Garrigou-Lagrange says, "the intimate reconciliation of Infinite Justice, Infinite Mercy, and Sovereign Freedom" (The Sense of Mystery, pg. 263). To understand this reconciliation is to comprehend God in His essence, which is something we cannot do this side of the Beatific Vision. Hence, mystery is precisely what we should expect when it comes to this issue. What we should be suspicious of is any system which dissolves the mystery. St. Thomas is not forced by logic to "flee" to the "refuge" of mystery. On the contrary, it is logic that leads St. Thomas to mystery. As Garrigou-Lagrange put it,

St Thomas has fear neither for logic nor for mystery. Indeed, logical lucidity leads him to see in nature those mysteries that speak in their own particular ways of the Creator. Likewise, this same lucidity aids him in putting into strong relief other secrets of a far superior order—those of grace and of the intimate life of God, which would remain unknown were it not for Divine Revelation (ibid., xxxix-xl).

End of dialogue.

Related post: An Incarnational Problem with Molinism?