The dogma of the Incarnation holds that the Divine Logos “became flesh and dwelt among us” (John 1:14). To elaborate, the Second Person of the Trinity, the eternal Son of God, took on a complete human nature in such a way that He was truly God and truly man (Christ). This mysterious and sublime union is referred to in theology as the Hypostatic Union. To properly understand this great mystery, we must neither divide the person (which would be the heresy of Nestorianism) nor confuse the natures (which would be the heresy of Monophysitism). In other words, there is but one person in the incarnated Christ, the Divine Logos; and there are two complete and distinct natures in the incarnated Christ, Divine and human. Moreover, we must recognize that in the Incarnated Christ, due to the completeness of both natures, there are two wills (the Divine will and a human will), rather than just one will (which would be the heresy of Monothelitism).
In this reflection, I want to focus on the following doctrine pertaining to the incarnated Christ and how it creates a pressing puzzle for Molinism:“Christ did not merely not sin in actuality, but He also could not sin. [Sent. fidei proxima.]” (Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, pg. 184)
This doctrine refers to the impeccability of Christ and has in mind specifically Christ’s human will. There is very clearly no metaphysical possibility of the Divine Will sinning as God not only can do no evil but cannot even be tempted by evil (cf. James 1:13). A human will, by contrast, is in general capable of sinning (and being tempted). What this doctrine is asserting, then, is that Christ’s human will is not capable of sinning. The basic reason is that Christ’s human will is joined, via the Hypostatic Union, to one and only one person, namely the Second Person of the Trinity. So, if Christ’s human will were to sin, then the sin would be committed by the Second Person of the Trinity, the very idea of which is blasphemous. Hence, Christ’s human will not only didn’t but couldn’t sin.
The puzzle to solve that arises from this doctrine is this: If a human will is in general capable of sinning and yet Christ’s human will was not capable of sinning, what accounts for this fact? This puzzle is resolved in different ways by different theological systems. For the purposes of this reflection, I will focus on just one such system, namely Molinism. I focus on this system because I personally tend to lean towards Molinism when it comes to the issues of human freedom, Divine Providence, and predestination (although, more recently, I find myself moving more towards the Thomist view). Furthermore, I think that, at least at first blush, Molinism has difficulty resolving this particular Christological puzzle due to its account of human freedom.
First, some brief remarks about Molinism. Molinism is a theological system originally developed by the 16th century Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina. Molina’s theological project was to develop an account of Divine Providence that reconciled a libertarian conception of human freedom and a strong and traditional conception of Divine sovereignty: Man is absolutely free (cf. Sirach 15:14-17), and God is absolutely sovereign (cf. Romans 9:19-23). As Molina himself summed up Divine Providence:
The puzzle to solve that arises from this doctrine is this: If a human will is in general capable of sinning and yet Christ’s human will was not capable of sinning, what accounts for this fact? This puzzle is resolved in different ways by different theological systems. For the purposes of this reflection, I will focus on just one such system, namely Molinism. I focus on this system because I personally tend to lean towards Molinism when it comes to the issues of human freedom, Divine Providence, and predestination (although, more recently, I find myself moving more towards the Thomist view). Furthermore, I think that, at least at first blush, Molinism has difficulty resolving this particular Christological puzzle due to its account of human freedom.
First, some brief remarks about Molinism. Molinism is a theological system originally developed by the 16th century Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina. Molina’s theological project was to develop an account of Divine Providence that reconciled a libertarian conception of human freedom and a strong and traditional conception of Divine sovereignty: Man is absolutely free (cf. Sirach 15:14-17), and God is absolutely sovereign (cf. Romans 9:19-23). As Molina himself summed up Divine Providence:
The leaf hanging from the tree does not fall, nor does either of the two sparrows sold for a farthing fall to the ground, nor does anything else whatever happen without God’s providence and will either intending it as a particular or permitting it as a particular (Concordia 4.45.3.17).
At the core of Molina’s system is the doctrine of middle knowledge (scientia media). By His middle knowledge, God knows (prior to the act of creation) what any free creature would freely choose to do in any set of circumstances in which said creature might be placed. For instance, God knows that if Peter were in the circumstances that he was in in the gospels, then he would freely deny Christ three times (cf. Matthew 26:69-75). Propositions such as this one about Peter are often referred to by Molinists as counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. By using His middle knowledge, God can meticulously plan and direct the world, down to the last detail, to His ultimate ends through, and without violating, the genuine free will of His creatures.
The difficulty for Molinism with respect to the impeccability of Christ is this: If Christ did not merely not sin but indeed could not sin and yet He was free, then it seems that the Molinist analysis of free will is flawed. The Molinist account of free will can be stated simply as follows: “That agent is said to be free, which, granted all the requisites for action, can either act or not act" (Predestination, pg. 136). Now, if we apply this definition to an action of Christ, then it seems that we are left with the conclusion that Christ could have sinned, thus contradicting Catholic doctrine. For instance, consider the action of loving God. Obviously, Christ loved God and loved Him freely. But, on the Molinist account of free will, this then entails that Christ could have either loved God or not loved God. But not loving God is a sin. Therefore, Christ could have sinned. Hence, Catholic doctrine is violated.
So, is the standard Molinist account of free will proximate to heresy (propositio haeresi proxima)? If the foregoing argument is sound, then yes. But is the argument sound? There are at least two ways to escape the argument: (1) Assert that the Molinist account of free will applies only to non-divine persons with human wills or (2) Provide an account in which it is true to say that Christ could not have sinned and yet the Molinist account of free will still applies to Christ. From a Molinist perspective, I take (1) to be basically a last resort due to its manifest degree of being ad hoc. Moreover, if Christ became like us in every respect but without sinning (cf. Hebrews 2:17; 4:15), then His human will should be free in the same sense that our wills are. Thus, the Molinist analysis of human freedom should apply to Christ’s human will just as much as it applies to ours. So, (2) it is.
If the doctrine of Christ’s impeccability can be accurately interpreted as the claim that there is no possible world in which Christ sins, then I think that the Molinist can successfully give an account of this. In this context, I am taking a possible world to mean a world such that possibly God actualizes it. Sometimes these are referred to as feasible worlds to distinguish them from merely logically possible worlds. There may be worlds, for instance, that are sufficiently bad that although they may be logically possible in and of themselves, God in His infinite goodness would never actualize them. A world in which every single rational creature is damned may be an example of such a world.
Let us, following the philosopher Thomas P. Flint, call Christ’s human nature that the Divine Logos assumes CHN (“The Possibilities of Incarnation: Some Radical Molinist Suggestions”, pp. 309). Now, in order to avoid theological censure, the Molinist must maintain that there is no possible world in which Christ assumes CHN and CHN sins. Any world in which CHN sins is a world in which the Divine Logos could not assume CHN. Molinism can account for this with its usual secret sauce of middle knowledge. God, by His middle knowledge (prior to the act of creation), knows what CHN would freely do in any set of circumstances in which CHN might be placed. So, if it is true that (i) If CHN were placed in circumstances C, then CHN would freely sin, then the Divine Logos cannot assume CHN in circumstances C. On the other hand, if it is true that (ii) If CHN were placed in circumstances D, then CHN would freely refrain from sinning, then the Divine Logos can assume CHN in circumstances D. All circumstances that satisfy (i) are non-assumable circumstances; all circumstances that satisfy (ii) are assumable circumstances (vis-à-vis the Incarnation).
Using this knowledge, God can guarantee that CHN never sins when assumed by the Divine Logos. And yet, CHN is truly free in the Molinist sense of being able to act or not act, sin or not sin. It is thus a contingent fact that CHN does not sin (a fact that God knows infallibly by His middle knowledge), but a necessary fact that Christ does not sin since the Divine Logos would never assume CHN unless CHN were to remain sinless in all circumstances in which the Divine Logos assumes CHN. Thus, Molinism can account for the impeccability of Christ while retaining its analysis of human freedom. Theological censure avoided.
The difficulty for Molinism with respect to the impeccability of Christ is this: If Christ did not merely not sin but indeed could not sin and yet He was free, then it seems that the Molinist analysis of free will is flawed. The Molinist account of free will can be stated simply as follows: “That agent is said to be free, which, granted all the requisites for action, can either act or not act" (Predestination, pg. 136). Now, if we apply this definition to an action of Christ, then it seems that we are left with the conclusion that Christ could have sinned, thus contradicting Catholic doctrine. For instance, consider the action of loving God. Obviously, Christ loved God and loved Him freely. But, on the Molinist account of free will, this then entails that Christ could have either loved God or not loved God. But not loving God is a sin. Therefore, Christ could have sinned. Hence, Catholic doctrine is violated.
So, is the standard Molinist account of free will proximate to heresy (propositio haeresi proxima)? If the foregoing argument is sound, then yes. But is the argument sound? There are at least two ways to escape the argument: (1) Assert that the Molinist account of free will applies only to non-divine persons with human wills or (2) Provide an account in which it is true to say that Christ could not have sinned and yet the Molinist account of free will still applies to Christ. From a Molinist perspective, I take (1) to be basically a last resort due to its manifest degree of being ad hoc. Moreover, if Christ became like us in every respect but without sinning (cf. Hebrews 2:17; 4:15), then His human will should be free in the same sense that our wills are. Thus, the Molinist analysis of human freedom should apply to Christ’s human will just as much as it applies to ours. So, (2) it is.
If the doctrine of Christ’s impeccability can be accurately interpreted as the claim that there is no possible world in which Christ sins, then I think that the Molinist can successfully give an account of this. In this context, I am taking a possible world to mean a world such that possibly God actualizes it. Sometimes these are referred to as feasible worlds to distinguish them from merely logically possible worlds. There may be worlds, for instance, that are sufficiently bad that although they may be logically possible in and of themselves, God in His infinite goodness would never actualize them. A world in which every single rational creature is damned may be an example of such a world.
Let us, following the philosopher Thomas P. Flint, call Christ’s human nature that the Divine Logos assumes CHN (“The Possibilities of Incarnation: Some Radical Molinist Suggestions”, pp. 309). Now, in order to avoid theological censure, the Molinist must maintain that there is no possible world in which Christ assumes CHN and CHN sins. Any world in which CHN sins is a world in which the Divine Logos could not assume CHN. Molinism can account for this with its usual secret sauce of middle knowledge. God, by His middle knowledge (prior to the act of creation), knows what CHN would freely do in any set of circumstances in which CHN might be placed. So, if it is true that (i) If CHN were placed in circumstances C, then CHN would freely sin, then the Divine Logos cannot assume CHN in circumstances C. On the other hand, if it is true that (ii) If CHN were placed in circumstances D, then CHN would freely refrain from sinning, then the Divine Logos can assume CHN in circumstances D. All circumstances that satisfy (i) are non-assumable circumstances; all circumstances that satisfy (ii) are assumable circumstances (vis-à-vis the Incarnation).
Using this knowledge, God can guarantee that CHN never sins when assumed by the Divine Logos. And yet, CHN is truly free in the Molinist sense of being able to act or not act, sin or not sin. It is thus a contingent fact that CHN does not sin (a fact that God knows infallibly by His middle knowledge), but a necessary fact that Christ does not sin since the Divine Logos would never assume CHN unless CHN were to remain sinless in all circumstances in which the Divine Logos assumes CHN. Thus, Molinism can account for the impeccability of Christ while retaining its analysis of human freedom. Theological censure avoided.
References:
Flint, Thomas P. “The Possibilities of Incarnation: Some Radical Molinist Suggestions.” Religious Studies, vol. 37, no. 3, 2001, pp. 307–320., https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412501005546.
Garrigou-Lagrange Réginald. Predestination: The Meaning of Predestination in Scripture and the Church. Translated by Dom Bede Rose, TAN Books, 1998.
Molina, Luis de, and Alfred J. Freddoso. On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia. Cornell University Press, 2004.
Ott, Ludwig. Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma. Edited by James Canon Bastible and Robert Fastiggi. Translated by Patrick Lynch, Baronius Press, 2018.
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