The Doctrine of Justification in Titus

The primary difference between the Catholic and Protestant understandings of justification is that the Catholic view holds that in justification we receive a gift of infused righteousness that interiorly renews us, making us a new creation, whereas the Protestant view holds that we receive a merely external righteousness (Christ's personal righteousness) that is legally imputed to us, and we receive this imputation by faith alone. Our righteousness before God is merely legal and not ontological. As John Calvin taught:

The Principle of Double Effect and the Atomic Bombings of WWII

Catholic moral theologians have consistently held that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States during World War II were gross violations of justice. The Church herself has taught this:

"Every act of war directed to the indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants is a crime against God and man, which merits firm and unequivocal condemnation." A danger of modern warfare is that it provides the opportunity to those who possess modern scientific weapons—especially atomic, biological, or chemical weapons—to commit such crimes (CCC 2314).

The Church and human reason assert the permanent validity of the moral law during armed conflicts. Practices deliberately contrary to the law of nations and to its universal principles are crimes (CCC 2328).

An Argument from Privileged Access to the Immateriality of the Mind

1. Thoughts have privileged access.
2. Physical things do not have privileged access.
3. Therefore, thoughts are not physical things (1, 2).
4. Thoughts are caused by minds.
5. Physical things cannot cause nonphysical things.
6. Therefore, minds are not physical (3, 4, 5).

The Dignity/Value Argument for the Justice of Hell

In an area of philosophy of religion and philosophical theology called the Problem of Hell, the eternity of Hell is thought to be unjust by some due to the fact that any crimes that human beings commit are finite and yet they are, for those who are damned, punished for an eternity in Hell. The punishment (which is infinite) does not fit the crime (which is finite) and so, the argument goes, Hell is unjust. There are a number of defenses and theodicies that have been offered by theologians and philosophers on behalf of the doctrine of Hell. One such defense is what we might call the “Infinite Dignity/Value” defense.

An Incarnational Problem with Molinism?

The dogma of the Incarnation holds that the Divine Logos “became flesh and dwelt among us” (John 1:14). To elaborate, the Second Person of the Trinity, the eternal Son of God, took on a complete human nature in such a way that He was truly God and truly man (Christ). This mysterious and sublime union is referred to in theology as the Hypostatic Union. To properly understand this great mystery, we must neither divide the person (which would be the heresy of Nestorianism) nor confuse the natures (which would be the heresy of Monophysitism). In other words, there is but one person in the incarnated Christ, the Divine Logos; and there are two complete and distinct natures in the incarnated Christ, Divine and human. Moreover, we must recognize that in the Incarnated Christ, due to the completeness of both natures, there are two wills (the Divine will and a human will), rather than just one will (which would be the heresy of Monothelitism).

In this reflection, I want to focus on the following doctrine pertaining to the incarnated Christ and how it creates a pressing puzzle for Molinism:

“Christ did not merely not sin in actuality, but He also could not sin. [Sent. fidei proxima.]” (Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, pg. 184)

The Evangelical Counsels

In moral theology, there is a distinction between a precept and a counsel. A precept is a moral duty, i.e., a moral obligation. A counsel is not obligatory but is expressly recommended and is supererogatory (Moral Theology: A Complete Course, Vol. I, pg. 141). This distinction is present in the Law of Christ. For example, while celibacy is not morally obligatory—we are free to instead choose the married life—it is the better way of life, according to St. Paul (cf. 1 Corinthians 7:38). There are numerous counsels in the Law of Christ, but they can generally be reduced to three categories, which are often collectively referred to in moral theology as the evangelical counsels. These counsels are as follows:

Is it a sin to do a good work without referring it to the glory of God?

It seems that it is sinful to do a good work without referring it to the glory of God, for it is a precept to do all things for the glory of God (cf. 1 Corinthians 10:31). Furthermore, our Lord teaches us that one of the key objects of good works is the glorification of God (cf. Matthew 5:16, John 15:8). Now, if the glorification of God is an essential end of good works, then works without this end wouldn’t seem to be truly and completely good works. The Westminster Confession (a Reformed confession of faith) expresses this idea as follows:

Works done by unregenerate men, although for the matter of them they may be things which God commands, and of good use both to themselves and others; yet because they proceed not from a heart purified by faith, nor are done in a right manner, according to the Word, nor to a right end, the glory of God; they are therefore sinful, and cannot please God, or make a man meet to receive grace from God. And yet their neglect of them is more sinful and displeasing unto God. (Westminster Confession, XVI.VII).

However, it seems that it is psychologically infeasible to actually refer every good work to the glory of God. Thus, this precept would seem to constitute an intolerable burden that few, if any, could bear. And this fact seems incompatible with the teaching of Sacred Scripture that the commandments of the Law of Christ are not burdensome (cf. Matthew 11:30, 1 John 5:3).

Furthermore, if this principle is true, then one would sin in every good work unless the good work is referred to the glory of God. But this is incompatible with St. Paul’s teaching that Gentiles do in fact do good by following the natural law and in such a way that such conduct may excuse them on the day of judgement (cf. Romans 2:14-16). But nobody is excused by the commission of sinful acts but rather only by righteous ones. Hence, since Gentiles do not refer their good works to the true God (since they do not even believe in and worship the true God), it follows that such is not necessary in order for a good work to be without sin. So, we seem to be in a quandary. What to do?

Applying the Golden Rule

 “So whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them; for this is the law and the prophets” (Matthew 7:12).

The Golden Rule is a fundamental moral precept of the natural law and is also rooted in the commandment to love our neighbor as ourselves (cf. Matthew 22:39, Mark 12:31, Luke 10:27, Romans 13:9). However, application of this principle can clearly go awry when carried out in a naïve manner. For we can imagine a masochist who enjoys people inflicting physical harm on him. Consequently, he desires people to inflict physical harm on him. Naively applying the Golden Rule, the masochist comes to conclude that he ought to inflict physical harm on others since this is what he would want them to do to him. (And assuming he takes pleasure in doing his perceived moral duty, our masochist would thereby become a sadomasochist!). This conclusion is clearly wrong. Not only does the masochist not have an obligation to inflict physical harm on others, but he is also positively prohibited from doing so. So, how should the Golden Rule be properly understood so as to not yield such obviously false moral conclusions?

An Argument Against Total Depravity

The Calvinist doctrine of total depravity says that, since the Fall, man's nature is entirely corrupt and capable of nothing but sin. Here is a summary of the doctrine straight from the horse's mouth:

[T]he whole man, from the crown of the head to the sole of the foot, is so deluged, as it were, that no part remains exempt from sin, and, therefore, everything which proceeds from him is imputed as sin (Institutes of the Christian Religion, II, 1, 9).

We are all sinners by nature, therefore we are held under the yoke of sin. But if the whole man is subject to the dominion of sin, surely the will, which is its principal seat, must be bound with the closest chains (ibid., II, 2, 27).

[I]t is vain to look for anything good in our nature. I confess indeed, that all…iniquities do not break out in every individual. Still it cannot be denied that the hydra lurks in every breast. For as a body, while it contains and fosters the cause and matter of disease, cannot be called healthy, although pain is not actually felt; so a soul, while teeming with such seeds of vice, cannot be called sound. This similitude, however, does not apply throughout. In a body however morbid the functions of life are performed; but the soul, when plunged into that deadly abyss, not only labours under vice, but is altogether devoid of good (ibid., II, 3, 2).

An Argument Against Open Theism

Open Theism is the view that, among other things, God lacks foreknowledge of the future. This is certainly in contradiction to the orthodox Christian view of God’s omniscience that is presented in Sacred Scripture (cf. 1 Samuel 23:9-14, Psalm 139:1-6, Acts 2:22-23; 4:27-28). It is also contrary to the solemn teaching of the Catholic Church as formally defined, for instance, by Vatican I: "All things are open and laid bare to his eyes [Heb. 4:13], even those things that will be done by the free actions of creatures" (Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, pg. 44). Ludwig Ott assigns the theological note of de fide to this doctrine. I have formulated the following argument against Open Theism that I think is interesting and persuasive. Note that a proposition is contingent if its truth value is not necessary. The argument focuses on contingent, future tense propositions because these are the propositions of most interest in the discussion on Open Theism. Open theists do not take issue with, for instance, God knowing the proposition “tomorrow, it will be the case that 2 + 2 = 4.” This is a necessary proposition in contrast to a contingent proposition like “tomorrow, there will be a sea battle.” It is knowledge of propositions like these that open theists deny to God.

When Laws/Duties Conflict: A Catholic Perspective

Sometimes in the moral life we find ourselves in a situation in which there seem to be two or more duties that are binding on us, and we cannot fulfill all of them. By fulfilling one, we would not be fulfilling another. For example, suppose that a pregnant woman is diagnosed with uterine cancer. She is told by her doctor that unless she undergoes a hysterectomy, she will die. However, if she does undergo the hysterectomy, the baby will die. So, it seems that she has conflicting duties: she ought to get the hysterectomy in order to save her life, yet she also ought to forgo the hysterectomy in order to preserve the life of her baby. Clearly, this woman cannot fulfill both of these duties in this situation.

Omnipotence, Uniqueness, and the Kalam Cosmological Argument

The Kalam Cosmological Argument is an argument for the existence of God that is broken up into two stages. The first stage purports to establish the existence of a transcendent First Cause of the universe, and the second stage purports to establish that this First Cause strongly resembles God as classically conceived. The foremost contemporary champion of the Kalam is the philosopher William Lane Craig. The first stage of the argument is commonly formulated by Craig in the form of the following syllogism:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

In the second stage, Craig undergoes a conceptual analysis in which he derives various of the traditional divine attributes that are necessarily possessed by the First Cause. According to Craig, the overall conclusion of the Kalam is that “an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful” (“The Kalam Cosmological Argument,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, pp. 196). In what follows, I will assume the general soundness of the Kalam argument. The interested reader can read my fairly lengthy treatment and defense of the Kalam argument here.