A Painful Personite Problem for Stage Theory

All the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players; they have their exits and their entrances, and one man in his time plays many parts.

— William Shakespeare

I. Introduction

Mark Johnston has argued that four-dimensionalist theories of persistence have “surprising, repellent and perhaps even disastrous, implications for our ordinary moral outlook.”[1] In response, Alex Kaiserman has argued that these disastrous implications afflict only one kind of four-dimensionalism, namely, worm theory, but that they do not afflict the alternative stage theory.[2] In this post, I argue that given some plausible premises having to do with pain and moral status, stage theory does not in fact escape the problem raised by Johnston.

Williams on the Passage of Time

I. Introduction

In his paper “The Myth of Passage,” Donald C. Williams argues against the passage of time (which, according to our former vice president, has great significance) as it is understood by many proponents of the A-theory of time.[1] One argument in particular that Williams offers is that there is no sense to be made of the notion that time itself moves. Given this, Williams argues that there is no such thing as the passage of time. He further argues that if the A-series of time exists, then there is the passage of time. He concludes that the A-series does not exist. In this post, I will give a reconstruction of Williams’ argument and offer an evaluation of it. In particular, I will offer criticisms of Williams’ argument as well as ways in which Williams can respond to such criticisms. Ultimately, however, I conclude that Williams’ argument does not succeed.

An Anti-Verificationist Critique of Einstein’s Argument Against Absolute Simultaneity

I. Introduction

In his classic book Relativity: The Special and the General Theory, Albert Einstein gave a famous argument for the relativity of simultaneity, i.e., for the thesis that the simultaneity/non-simultaneity of two events in time at different locations in space is relative to the reference frame that the events are observed in and that not all reference frames will be in agreement with respect to which events are simultaneous/non-simultaneous. Further, Einstein argues that all reference frames are equally valid and that the notion of frame-transcendent simultaneity is meaningless. Einstein concludes from all of this that there is no relation of absolute simultaneity. In this post, I shall give a detailed summary and logical reconstruction of Einstein’s argumentation and then offer a critique of it. I will argue that Einstein’s conclusion that there is no relation of absolute simultaneity relies on the logical positivist principle of verification. Insofar as this principle is false (as is widely acknowledged), Einstein’s argument fails to show that there is no relation of absolute simultaneity and is thus unsound. As will be seen, this failure has some important upshots.

Aristotle on Primary and Secondary Substance in the Categories

Aristotle lays out his understanding of the difference between primary and secondary substance in the Categories. In this post, I will explain both Aristotle’s understanding of substance in general as he lays it out in the Categories and his understanding of the difference between primary and secondary substance in particular.

An Argument From Reason Against Mereological Nihilism

Mereological nihilism is the metaphysical thesis that composite objects do not exist. Formally, letting P denote the parthood relational predicate:

Pxy ↔ x = y.

When combined with materialism (as is often done), mereological nihilism entails that the only things that exist are physical simples (such as, for example, quarks and electrons). What are taken by common sense to be composite objects (sometimes referred to by philosophers as "common objects") are, according to the mereological nihilist, really nothing but various arrangements of these simples. So, for instance, a chair is nothing but a collection of simples arranged chair-wise. Similarly, a rock is nothing but a collection of simples arranged rock-wise. And so on. The reality of metaphysical substances is denied. With that being said, some forms of mereological nihilism are less radical than others. For example, the metaphysician Peter van Inwagen holds to a restricted form of mereological nihilism that allows for the existence of composite living things (e.g., plants, animals, and humans), while holding everything else to be nothing but arrangements of simples.

In this post, I want to focus on the most extreme form of mereological nihilism: the thesis that there are no composite objects whatsoever, be they living or otherwise. I also will be assuming strict materialism (i.e., to be is to be physical). I shall argue that mereological nihilism thus understood—what we might call strong materialist mereological nihilism—is incompatible with the reality of rationality and valid logical inference.