The doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) holds that God is absolutely metaphysically simple. In Catholic theology, this doctrine has the status of a formal dogma as defined by Lateran IV and reaffirmed by Vatican I. The DDS is commonly understood to entail that everything in God (i.e., everything intrinsic to God) is identical to God (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, ST I.28.2 ad 1).
A common objection to this doctrine is the so-called modal collapse argument that attempts to show that if the DDS is true, then everything becomes necessary. In particular, creation becomes necessary, which is particularly problematic for Catholic theology, which holds as a formal dogma that creation is a free (and hence unnecessary) act on the part of God. The basic argument is this: Given the DDS, everything intrinsic to God is identical to God. Now, God's act of creation (given that it is an action of God) is intrinsic to God. Hence, God is identical to God's act of creation. Next, God is a necessary being and so God exists necessarily. It is then supposed to follow that, necessarily, God's act of creation exists. And since, necessarily, if God's act of creation exists, then creation exists, it thereby follows that, necessarily, creation exists. The most crucial part of the argument is the following:
- Necessarily, God exists.
- God is identical to God's act of creation.
- Therefore, necessarily, God's act of creation exists.
But as Christopher Tomaszewski has ably pointed out, this argument is formally invalid (see his Analysis article "Collapsing the modal collapse argument: On an invalid argument against divine simplicity"). Here is a clear counterexample:
- Necessarily, 8 is greater than 7.
- The number of planets is identical to 8.
- Therefore, necessarily, the number of planets is greater than 7.
The premises of the counterexample are clearly true, and the conclusion is clearly false. Since the counterexample has the same logical form as the original argument, it thereby follows that the original argument is logically invalid and can therefore be dismissed.
In order to get the desired conclusion, the proponent of modal collapse would have to change (2) to (2'): Necessarily, God is identical to God's act of creation. This would yield a valid argument concluding with the necessary existence of God's act of creation. But (2') can easily be rejected by (as Tomaszewski does) maintaining that 'God's act of creation' does not designate rigidly. As has become standard since the seminal work of Saul Kripke (see his Naming and Necessity), a term is said to designate rigidly just in case it refers to (or picks out or names) the same thing in every possible world in which that thing exists and never refers to anything else.
Tomaszewski denies that 'God's act of creation' designates rigidly by maintaining that while God's act is intrinsic to God and therefore identical to God, 'God's act of creation' designates God's act not how it is in itself but rather by way of its effects (which are contingent), namely, creation. Now, since God exists in every possible world, but creation (being contingent) does not, it follows that 'God's act of creation' does not designate rigidly. Thus, there is no implication from 'God' = 'God's act of creation' to necessarily, 'God' = 'God's act of creation.' So, (2') can be rejected, and the modal collapse argument thereby fails.
With all this being said, there is another problem that is not as easily resolved on Tomaszewski's account. Consider the following argument:
- Necessarily, if A = B, then everything true of A is true of B and vice versa (Leibniz's Law).
- God is identical to God's act of creation.
- God is eternal.
- Therefore, God's act of creation is eternal (1-3).
- If God's act of creation is eternal, then creation is eternal.
- Therefore, creation is eternal (4, 5).
This argument came up in a discussion I had with a friend, though the basic thrust of it has also been defended by R.T. Mullins (see his The End of the Timeless God, pg. 101, 109-110). The argument is logically valid, and the fact that 'God's act of creation' does not designate rigidly does not help us here. For Leibniz's Law does not depend on the necessity of an identity statement. If two terms refer to the same thing in the actual world (regardless of whether this is the case in other possible worlds), then the thing that the first term refers to is the same thing that the second term refers to, and the first thing and the second thing will necessarily be identical. As Kripke explains,
If 'a' and 'b' are rigid designators, it follows that 'a = b', if true, is a necessary truth. If 'a' and 'b' are not rigid designators, no such conclusion follows about the statement 'a = b' (though the objects designated by 'a' and 'b' will be necessarily identical (Naming and Necessity, Preface, pg. 3).
It will thus be the case (by Leibniz's Law) that everything true of the thing that the first term refers to will also be true of the thing that the second term refers to and vice versa. As such, if God is identical to God's act of creation, and if God is eternal, then God's act of creation will also be eternal. The necessity (or lack thereof) of the identity statement in question is irrelevant. To be clear, the issue is not that 'God's act of creation' designates God in every possible world and thus renders it necessary that God creates. There are worlds in which God does not create and thus worlds in which 'God's act of creation' does not designate God (in such worlds, 'God's act of creation' does not designate anything). The problem is that in every world in which 'God's act of creation' does designate God, God's act of creation is eternal. And this seems to imply that creation is eternal in these worlds as well, i.e., creation is eternal in every world in which there is a creation.
Now, the conclusion of the foregoing argument is unacceptable from the standpoint of Catholic theology as it is a formal dogma (Lateran IV and Vatican I) that creation had a beginning in time. That God is eternal is also a formal dogma. So, the only premises that are candidates for being rejected from the standpoint of the Faith as such are (7), (8), and (11). (7), viz., Leibniz's Law, I take to be a self-evident first principle. As such, I will not consider rejecting it. So, it comes down to (8) and (11). Tomaszewski's account, as we've seen, is committed to (8). So, he must find a way to reject (11).
Why think that (11) is true? Suppose there is an eternal action of a bowling ball depressing a cushion. Then, it seems there must also be an eternal passion of a cushion being depressed by a bowling ball. The depressing of the cushion and the cushion being depressed are the same event considered under different aspects. As such, if the depressing of the cushion is eternal, then the cushion being depressed must also be eternal. In the same way, if God creating the universe is eternal, then the universe being created must also be eternal. It seems to follow from this that there is an eternal creation.
While I think that the prospects for rejecting (11) are not hopeless (there is a bit of an intuitive leap from "the event of the universe being created is eternal" to "there is something created that is eternal"), I've become convinced that the better option is actually to reject (8). At a Thomistic Institute workshop on divine simplicity back in June, W. Matthews Grant presented an extrinsic model of God's act of creation as an alternative to Tomaszewski's identity with non-rigid designation approach. He motivated the account completely independently of the argument presently under consideration, but I think the challenge of responding to this argument can further motivate the account, which is one of my reasons for writing this post.
The basic idea is that 'God's act of creation' does not (pace Tomaszewski) designate God insofar as He is a creator, but rather designates God together with creation and its real relation of dependence on God. On this picture, God's creative act is partially extrinsically constituted. This is motivated by the Aristotelian idea that the action of the agent is in the patient (cf. Physics III.3, Metaphysics IX.8). Now, because God's creative act on this view is partially extrinsic to God, it follows that God is not identical to God's creative act. This can be seen as follows:
- 'God's act of creation' designates God together with creation and its real relation of dependence on God.
- So, God's act of creation is partially extrinsic to God.
- Identity is a purely internal relation.
- Therefore, God's act of creation is not identical to God.
Since 'God's act of creation' simpliciter is partially intrinsic and partially extrinsic, it is helpful to have terms that exclusively refer, respectively, to the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of God's act of creation. In this regard, I think it is profitable to adopt some terminology due to Steven Nemes:
A distinction may be made between two senses of any ascription of action to God. In the causal sense, the ascription refers to that in virtue of which God produces His effect, namely Himself, His being with which He is identical. In the effectual sense, on the other hand, it refers to the effect which God produces, some contingently existing state of affairs, insofar as it is caused by God. The phrase “God’s act of creation” in the causal sense refers to God Himself as the cause of creation, and it refers in the effectual sense to the existence of some created being insofar as this is caused by God (“Divine simplicity does not entail modal collapse,” pp. 112-113).
I propose, then, that we maintain that 'God's act of creation' without qualification designates God together with creation and its real relation of dependence on God, 'God's act of creation' in the causal sense designates God insofar as He is the cause of creation, and 'God's act of creation' in the effectual sense designates the creation insofar as it is caused by (and has a real relation of dependence on) God. The unqualified sense refers to God's act of creation taken as a whole (which is partially intrinsic and partially extrinsic to God). The causal sense refers to the intrinsic aspect of God's act of creation. Finally, the effectual sense refers to the extrinsic aspect of God's act of creation.
On this model, we can maintain that 'God's act of creation' simpliciter designates rigidly while also holding that God's act of creation (simpliciter) exists contingently. One upshot of this is that God's act of creation does not exist in worlds in which there is no creation. It is not just that the object designated by 'God's act of creation' in worlds in which there is a creation is not designated by 'God's act of creation' in worlds in which there is not a creation (as on Tomaszewski's account). Rather, it's also that the object designated by 'God's act of creation' in worlds in which there is a creation does not exist in worlds in which there is not a creation. So, there is a more robust sense in which God's act of creation varies across possible worlds on Grant's account than there is on Tomaszewski's account.
More significantly for the purposes of this post, though, is that Grant's account allows us to affirm the DDS while rejecting the foregoing argument (7-12) for the eternality of creation. For on this account, God is not identical to God's act of creation. So, (8) is false and thus the argument does not go through. More comprehensively, the argument will not go through on this account no matter which of the aforementioned ways of understanding 'God's act of creation' is adopted. Obviously, if more than one sense of 'God's act of creation' is used in the argument, then the argument is guilty of the fallacy of equivocation. Otherwise, the evaluation of the argument breaks down as follows: Throughout the argument, 'God's act of creation' is either used (a) without qualification, (b) in the causal sense, or (c) in the effectual sense. If (a) or (c), then (8) will be false. If (b), then (8) will be true, but (11) will be false. For 'God's act of creation' in the causal sense does not designate an object that is sufficient for the existence of creation. In any case, therefore, the argument has at least one false premise and so the conclusion is blocked.
Given all of the foregoing, it seems to me that Grant's account of the relationship between God and God's act of creation is more easily reconcilable with creation having a temporal beginning than Tomaszewski's account is. As such, I think this is evidence in favor of Grant's account being the preferable way of understanding these difficult issues.
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