It seems obvious that there are unbelievers (and thus those who have not been regenerated by grace) who do good and who have genuine virtue. This basic fact of experience seems to falsify the doctrine of total depravity. John Calvin, however, did not think this to be a successful objection. In response, Calvin wrote as follows:
If a natural man possesses such integrity of manners, nature is not without the faculty of studying virtue. But what if his mind was depraved and perverted, and followed anything rather than rectitude? Such it undoubtedly was, if you grant that he was only a natural man. How then will you laud the power of human nature for good, if, even where there is the highest semblance of integrity, a corrupt bias is always detected? Therefore, as you would not commend a man for virtue whose vices impose upon you by a show of virtue, so you will not attribute a power of choosing rectitude to the human will while rooted in depravity (see August. lib. 4, Cont. Julian). Still, the surest and easiest answer to the objection is, that those are not common endowments of nature, but special gifts of God, which he distributes in divers forms, and, in a definite measure, to men otherwise profane [As a brief aside, this is essentially a statement of the Reformed doctrine of common grace]. For which reason, we hesitate not, in common language, to say, that one is of a good, another of a vicious nature; though we cease not to hold that both are placed under the universal condition of human depravity. All we mean is that God has conferred on the one a special grace which he has not seen it meet to confer on the other (Institutes of the Christian Religion II, 3, 4).
Continuing,
But as those endued with the greatest talents were always impelled by the greatest ambitions (a stain which defiles all virtues and makes them lose all favour in the sight of God), so we cannot set any value on anything that seems praiseworthy in ungodly men. We may add, that the principal part of rectitude is wanting, when there is no zeal for the glory of God, and there is no such zeal in those whom he has not regenerated by his Spirit. Nor is it without good cause said in Isaiah, that on Christ should rest “the spirit of knowledge, and of the fear of the Lord,” (Isa. 11:2); for by this we are taught that all who are strangers to Christ are destitute of that fear of God which is the beginning of wisdom (Ps. 111:10). The virtues which deceive us by an empty show may have their praise in civil society and the common intercourse of life, but before the judgment-seat of God they will be of no value to establish a claim of righteousness (ibid.).
This idea that the virtues of pagans are actually in some sense vices is shared by Lutheran theology (cf. Formula of Concord, II, 24 & 29). It is also shared by St. Augustine:
For though the soul may seem to rule the body admirably, and the reason the vices, if the soul and reason do not themselves obey God, as God has commanded them to serve Him, they have no proper authority over the body and the vices. For what kind of mistress of the body and the vices can that mind be which is ignorant of the true God, and which, instead of being subject to His authority, is prostituted to the corrupting influences of the most vicious demons? It is for this reason that the virtues which it seems to itself to possess, and by which it restrains the body and the vices that it may obtain and keep what it desires, are rather vices than virtues so long as there is no reference to God in the matter. For although some suppose that virtues which have a reference only to themselves, and are desired only on their own account, are yet true and genuine virtues, the fact is that even then they are inflated with pride, and are therefore to be reckoned vices rather than virtues. For as that which gives life to the flesh is not derived from flesh, but is above it, so that which gives blessed life to man is not derived from man, but is something above him; and what I say of man is true of every celestial power and virtue whatsoever (The City of God, Bk. XIX, Ch. 23).
Augustine’s point of view, however, must be properly nuanced. For Augustine, “true” virtue is that which is relevant to and ordered to salvation. In this regard, pagans do not have true virtue. Catholic theology after Augustine is generally in agreement with this but opts to use language that preserves the genuine (natural) goodness of non-supernatural virtues by making a distinction between acquired virtues and infused virtues. These categories are distinguished according to their object and cause. St. Thomas Aquinas presents a summary teaching on this concept as follows:
We have spoken above in a general way about the production of habits from acts; and speaking now in a special way of this matter in relation to virtue, we must take note that, as stated above, man’s virtue perfects him in relation to good. Now since the notion of good consists in mode, species, and order, as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni. iii), or in number, weight, and measure, as expressed in Wis. xi. 21, man’s good must needs be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is twofold, as stated above, viz., human reason and Divine Law. And since Divine Law is the higher rule, it extends to more things, so that whatever is ruled by human reason, is ruled by the Divine Law too; but the converse does not hold.
It follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined according to the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts: inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule the aforesaid good is established.—On the other hand, virtue which directs man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human reason, cannot be caused by human acts, the principle of which is reason, but is produced in us by the Divine operation alone. Hence Augustine in giving the definition of the latter virtue inserts the words, which God works in us without us (Super Ps. cxviii, Serm. xxvi). (Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 63, Art. 2).
Acquired virtues are naturally obtained by man through repeated acts or result from nature without repeated acts. Infused virtues are supernaturally produced in us by God. Acquired virtues are ordered towards natural happiness and personal (natural) excellence in accordance with natural human reason, whereas infused virtues are ordered towards our Last End, namely, God and eternity with Him. Acts performed under the impetus of acquired virtues might be morally good, but they are not supernaturally good and meritorious. Consequently, they are not relevant in the order of salvation. For supernaturally good works, infused virtues are necessary, above all charity, and these are special gifts from God that cannot be obtained by any amount of human effort (cf. Moral Theology: A Complete Course, Vol. I, pg. 66-72).
Insofar as the acquired virtues, which even many pagans may have, do not direct man to his (supernatural) Last End, they are imperfect virtues. They may suffice for natural good but not for supernatural good. This is the sense in which St. Augustine’s teaching on this matter should be understood. Given his closing statement, it is clear that Augustine has in mind what later theologians would call infused virtues: “For as that which gives life to the flesh is not derived from flesh, but is above it, so that which gives blessed life to man is not derived from man, but is something above him.” Blessed life refers to our Last End. Hence, only supernaturally infused virtues are relevant in this matter. Acquired virtues, though naturally good, simply have no force whatsoever in the order of salvation (cf. Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, pg. 253). This may even be what Calvin is most concerned to underscore as well, based on his closing statement in the foregoing quoted passage from him: “The virtues which deceive us by an empty show may have their praise in civil society and the common intercourse of life, but before the judgment-seat of God they will be of no value to establish a claim of righteousness.” Catholic theology is in full agreement that acquired virtues such as are had even by pagans outside of the state of grace have no merit in the order of justification and salvation (cf. Council of Trent: On Justification, Canon I).
This is where it is crucial to understand the fundamental divide between the natural order and the supernatural order. In a state of original sin, man is still capable of at least some good in the natural order but not in the supernatural order. Only good in the supernatural order is relevant to salvation. And only grace can bridge the divide between the natural and the supernatural. This is the mystery of the relationship between nature and grace (cf. The Sense of Mystery: Clarity and Obscurity in the Intellectual Life, pg. 188-197, 203, 206-216). Calvin’s motivation for holding to total depravity seems to be to ensure the absolute necessity of grace for any and every facet of salvation. But total depravity isn’t needed to accomplish this noble goal. Recognizing the distinction between the natural and supernatural orders suffices.
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