On an Argument from Divine Simplicity to the Eternality of Creation

Are you toying with me and turning me around in an impossible maze of logic? For now you enter by the way you left, and then you leave by the way you entered. Or are you weaving some wonderful web of divine simplicity?

— Boethius

The doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) holds that God is absolutely metaphysically simple. In Catholic theology, this doctrine has the status of a formal dogma as defined by Lateran IV and reaffirmed by Vatican I. The DDS is commonly understood to entail that everything in God (i.e., everything intrinsic to God) is identical to God (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, ST I.28.2 ad 1).

Aristotle on Primary and Secondary Substance in the Categories

Aristotle lays out his understanding of the difference between primary and secondary substance in the Categories. In this post, I will explain both Aristotle’s understanding of substance in general as he lays it out in the Categories and his understanding of the difference between primary and secondary substance in particular.

The Holiness of the Church as a Motive of Credibility and the "Argument from Meager Moral Fruits"

Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works and give glory to your Father who is in heaven — Matthew 5:16

In Catholic apologetics, there are various motives of credibility that the apologist can appeal to in his defense of the Faith. The twentieth-century Thomist theologian Fr. Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, in his masterwork on fundamental theology and apologetics, defines and explains motives of credibility as follows:

According to the Catholic Church, the motives of credibility are the signs or notes by which revealed religion is made evidently credible to divine faith. They are called signs or notes inasmuch as they manifest the divine origin of revealed religion (or inasmuch as they are "arguments for divine revelation"). They are called motives in relation to the judgement of credibility, which is founded on them" (On Divine Revelation: The Teaching of the Catholic Faith, I.16.1.3; emphases in original).

One motive of credibility in particular is the holiness of the Church, particularly with respect to her many extraordinary saints and martyrs as well as the good works and general virtuousness of her ordinary practicing members (the latter will be my focus in this post). The Church herself draws attention to this motive of credibility in her official teaching:

All Have Sinned? On an Argument Against the Sinlessness of Mary

A standard Protestant argument (and the one that seems to be the most popular on social media) against the Catholic doctrine of Mary's sinlessness is rooted in the alleged fact that Sacred Scripture teaches that all human beings have sinned:

[A]ll have sinned and fall short of the glory of God (Romans 3:23).

Now, since Mary is a human being, it follows that Mary is a sinner. Apparently, then, the argument for Mary being a sinner is as follows:

1. For any x, if x is human, then x is a sinner.
2. Mary is human.
3. Therefore, Mary is a sinner.

The Fine-Tuning Argument and the Gap Problem: Some Objections Considered

I. Introduction

The fine-tuning argument (FTA) is an argument for an Intelligent Designer of the physical universe. The basic idea is that physicists have discovered that a number of the fundamental constants that show up in the laws of physics (e.g., the cosmological constant and the fine structure constant) are remarkably fine-tuned for the existence of biological life.[1] What such “fine-tuning” amounts to is that there is a wide range of reasonable values that these constants could take on but a comparatively narrow—very narrow, in fact—range of life-permitting values, that is, values that would make the existence of biological life possible. As it happens, it is an empirical discovery that the values these constants have in fact taken on fall within the life-permitting range. Had this not been the case, biological life would not have been possible. Given the wide range of possible, reasonable values and the narrow range of life-permitting values, it is highly improbable that the constants should have taken on life-permitting values and thus highly improbable that there would be biological life. Yet here we are.

God as a Hypothesis: A Response to Edward Feser

On his blog, Edward Feser argues that it is illegitimate to think of God as a hypothesis (Edward Feser: Is God’s existence a “hypothesis”?) I disagree. To begin, it is important to attend to what Feser means by "hypothesis." He adopts the following definitions, which he sees as being complementary to one another:

Hypothesis:

• [A] conditional or provisional explanation of observed facts or of their connection with each other; a tentative explanation suggestive of further experiment and verification.
• As used in the natural sciences, a predictive judgment about an empirical event that will occur under a describable set of conditions.  (Hypotheses are sometimes generated by more general theories; if the predicted events in fact occur, the hypotheses are said to be confirmed, and this in turn provides additional rational support for the theories in question.)

Master's Thesis

For anyone who might be interested, my master's thesis has now been published and is accessible HERE.

Biblical Cryptography: The Atbash Cipher

Cryptography is the art and science of secure and private communications. Very simply put, the main idea is for a sender (call her Alice) to take a message, turn it into nonsense, and send it to a receiver (call him Bob). Upon receiving the nonsense message from Alice, Bob turns it back into the original message so that he can read it. An eavesdropper (call her Eve) who might intercept the nonsense message should be unable to turn it back into the original message. The process of turning a message into nonsense is called encryption, and the process of turning nonsense back into a message is called decryption. Thus, Alice encrypts a message and sends it to Bob, and Bob decrypts the message and reads it. Eve is (ideally) unable to decrypt the message even if she intercepts it.

Trouble in Paradise: Evil, Evidence, and the Problem of Paradise

In the previous post, I considered arguments for the conclusion that evil is evidence for the existence of God. In this post, I want to consider an argument for the conclusion that evil is evidence against the existence of God. The argument is defended by appeal to what is known in the academic literature as the problem of paradise, which Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne, and Yoaav Isaacs introduce as follows:

Problem of Paradise: Consider a world of pleasures with no pain, of goods with no evil— an Eden. If the world were like that, then we think that would constitute a fairly overwhelming argument for the existence of God. In such an Edenic world, atheists would face the problem of paradise. But if the probability of God is higher given the complete absence of evil (in an Edenic world), then the presence of evil (as in our world) must reduce the probability of God. Put otherwise: if the absence of evil is evidence for God, then the presence of evil is evidence against the existence of God ("Evil and Evidence," pg. 5-6).

The Problem of Evil and the Moral Argument for God: A Corrective to Popular Apologetics

"Surprisingly, though, evil is actually evidence for God, not against Him." — Greg Koukl

"True evil is evidence for God’s existence." — J. Warner Wallace

"But because there is evil and because theism better predicts or explains those things needed to make sense of evil, then evil provides great evidence for the existence of God." — Pat Flynn

"While the existence of evil is a serious problem, it is an even more serious problem for atheists because the existence of evil is only further evidence for God’s existence." — Daniel King

"Again, the problem of evil—the leading anti-theistic argument—turns out to be an argument for God’s existence." — Paul Copan

Mathematical Certainty, Computer-Assisted Proofs, and the Mind: A Short Argument Against Materialism

In the philosophy of mathematics, there is a debate over whether computer-assisted proofs are true mathematical proofs. Those who argue that they are not hold that computer-assisted proofs are partially empirical and rely on the outcome of a physical experiment in the form of the execution of a computer program on physical computer hardware. As such, a computer-assisted proof cannot have the kind of epistemic certainty that mathematical proofs are traditionally thought to enjoy. Instead, the epistemic certainty of such a proof is reduced to the certainty had by the results of the natural sciences (e.g., physics and chemistry). This is because a computer is a physical system and as such we can only have as much confidence in its results as we can have in the theoretically predicted outcomes of physical experiments obtaining in practice and in the reliability of human-engineered machines, and this confidence obviously falls short of the kind of certainty that we typically associate with the results of mathematics.

Some Clarifications on an Argument Against the Bible Being a Fallible Collection of Infallible Books

In previous posts (HERE and HERE), I formulated the following argument against the Bible being a fallible collection of infallible books:

1. If a collection of books is fallible, then it can be the case that something that one of the books in the collection teaches is wrong (since at least one of the books could be fallible).
2. If a collection of books is a collection of infallible books, then all of the books in the collection are infallible.
3. If a book is infallible, then it cannot be the case that something it teaches is wrong.
4. Therefore, if a collection of books is a collection of infallible books, then all of the books in the collection are such that it cannot be the case that something that one of the books in the collection teaches is wrong (2, 3).
5. Therefore, if a collection of books is a collection of infallible books, then it is not the case that the collection of books is fallible (1, 4).
6. Assume for reductio that Sacred Scripture is a fallible collection of infallible books.
7. Then, Sacred Scripture is not a fallible collection of infallible books (5, 6).
8. Contradiction (6, 7). Therefore, Sacred Scripture is not a fallible collection of infallible books.

After recently receiving some friendly pushback on this argument in the form of private correspondence, I would like to clarify some of the fundamental principles and assumptions at play in the argument which were left implicit in previous presentations.

Catholic Answers Article on Presuppositional Apologetics

I am pleased to write that Catholic Answers has published an article of mine on Catholic presuppositionalism. Check it out here: https://www.catholic.com/magazine/online-edition/how-to-avoid-verse-slinging-with-protestants

An Argument From Reason Against Mereological Nihilism

Mereological nihilism is the metaphysical thesis that composite objects do not exist. Formally, letting P denote the parthood relational predicate:

Pxy ↔ x = y.

When combined with materialism (as is often done), mereological nihilism entails that the only things that exist are physical simples (such as, for example, quarks and electrons). What are taken by common sense to be composite objects (sometimes referred to by philosophers as "common objects") are, according to the mereological nihilist, really nothing but various arrangements of these simples. So, for instance, a chair is nothing but a collection of simples arranged chair-wise. Similarly, a rock is nothing but a collection of simples arranged rock-wise. And so on. The reality of metaphysical substances is denied. With that being said, some forms of mereological nihilism are less radical than others. For example, the metaphysician Peter van Inwagen holds to a restricted form of mereological nihilism that allows for the existence of composite living things (e.g., plants, animals, and humans), while holding everything else to be nothing but arrangements of simples.

In this post, I want to focus on the most extreme form of mereological nihilism: the thesis that there are no composite objects whatsoever, be they living or otherwise. I also will be assuming strict materialism (i.e., to be is to be physical). I shall argue that mereological nihilism thus understood—what we might call strong materialist mereological nihilism—is incompatible with the reality of rationality and valid logical inference.

A Protestant Parody of Catholic Presuppositionalism?

In the previous post, I laid out an argument against the Protestant doctrine of sola Scriptura as follows (I have added steps 9 and 10 for the purposes of this post):

1. If a collection of books is fallible, then it can be the case that something that one of the books in the collection teaches is wrong (since at least one of the books could be fallible).
2. If a collection of books is a collection of infallible books, then all of the books in the collection are infallible.
3. If a book is infallible, then it cannot be the case that something it teaches is wrong.
4. Therefore, if a collection of books is a collection of infallible books, then all of the books in the collection are such that it cannot be the case that something that one of the books in the collection teaches is wrong (2, 3).
5. Therefore, if a collection of books is a collection of infallible books, then it is not the case that the collection of books is fallible (1, 4).
6. Assume for reductio that Sacred Scripture is a fallible collection of infallible books.
7. Then, Sacred Scripture is not a fallible collection of infallible books (5, 6).
8. Contradiction (6, 7). Therefore, Sacred Scripture is not a fallible collection of infallible books.
9. If the doctrine of sola Scriptura is true, then Sacred Scripture is a fallible collection of infallible books.
10. Therefore, the doctrine of sola Scriptura is false (8, 9).

The justification for (9) is that given that the canon of Scripture is not taught in Scripture and given that sola Scriptura maintains that Scripture is the sole infallible authority, it follows that the canon (since we know of it by a source other than Scripture) is known only fallibly. But then since the canon specifies the collection of books that belong in Scripture, Scripture becomes—epistemologically speaking—a fallible collection of infallible books. The other premises essentially just unpack the concept of a fallible collection of infallible books.

This argument seems rather devastating for the Protestant doctrine of sola Scriptura. But consider the following parody argument that a Protestant could construct against the Catholic doctrine of an infallible Magisterium:

Verse Slinging, Ultimate Authority, and Presuppositionalism

Unless I am convinced by the testimony of the scriptures or by clear reason (for I do not trust either in the pope or in councils alone, since it is well known that they have often erred and contradicted themselves), I am bound by the scriptures I have quoted and my conscience is captive to the word of God. I cannot and I will not retract anything, since it is neither safe nor right to go against conscience — Martin Luther

Taking it for granted, that a universal council is a true representation of the Church, they set out with this principle, and, at the same time, lay it down as incontrovertible, that such councils are under the immediate guidance of the Holy Spirit, and therefore cannot err. But as they rule councils, nay, constitute them, they in fact claim for themselves whatever they maintain to be due to councils. Therefore, they will have our faith to stand and fall at their pleasure, so that whatever they have determined on either side must be firmly seated in our minds...And that my readers may the better understand the hinge on which the question chiefly turns, I will briefly explain what our opponents demand, and what we resist. When they deny that the Church can err, their end and meaning are to this effect: Since the Church is governed by the Spirit of God, she can walk safely without the word; in whatever direction she moves, she cannot think or speak anything but the truth, and hence, if she determines anything without or beside the word of God, it must be regarded in no other light than if it were a divine oracle — John Calvin

[H]ow many Absaloms have there been in our age, who, to seduce and distort the people of Our Lord from obedience to the Church and her pastors, and to lead away Christian lealty into rebellion and revolt, have cried up and down the ways of Germany and of France: there is no one appointed by God to hear doubts concerning the faith and to answer them; the Church itself, the rulers of the Church, have no power to determine what we are to hold as to the faith and what we are not; we must seek other judges than the prelates, the Church can err in its decrees and rules. But what more hurtful and audacious proposition could they make to Christianity than that? If then the Church can err, O Calvin, O Luther, to whom shall I have recourse in my difficulties? To the Scripture, say they. But what shall I, poor man, do, for it is precisely about the Scripture that my difficulty lies — St. Francis de Sales

Here, possibly, some one may ask, Do heretics also appeal to Scripture? They do indeed, and with a vengeance; for you may see them scamper through every single book of Holy Scripture — through the books of Moses, the books of Kings, the Psalms, the Epistles, the Gospels, the Prophets. Whether among their own people, or among strangers, in private or in public, in speaking or in writing, at convivial meetings, or in the streets, hardly ever do they bring forward anything of their own which they do not endeavour to shelter under words of Scripture. Read the works of Paul of Samosata, of Priscillian, of Eunomius, of Jovinian, and the rest of those pests, and you will see an infinite heap of instances, hardly a single page, which does not bristle with plausible quotations from the New Testament or the Old — St. Vincent of Lérins

A Protestant Escape Rope for James 2?

A neuralgic point of contention between Catholics and Protestants is over the correct interpretation of James 2 with respect to the relationship of faith, good works, and justification. St. James teaches the following:

What does it profit, my brethren, if a man says he has faith but has not works? Can his faith save him? If a brother or sister is poorly clothed and in lack of daily food, and one of you says to them, "Go in peace, be warmed and filled," without giving them the things needed for the body, what does it profit? So faith by itself, if it has no works, is dead.

But some one will say, "You have faith and I have works." Show me your faith apart from your works, and I by my works will show you my faith. You believe that God is one; you do well. Even the demons believe—and shudder. Do you want to be shown, you foolish fellow, that faith apart from works is barren? Was not Abraham our father justified by works, when he offered his son Isaac upon the altar? You see that faith was active along with his works, and faith was completed by works, and the Scripture was fulfilled which says, "Abraham believed God, and it was reckoned to him as righteousness"; and he was called the friend of God. You see that a man is justified by works and not by faith alone. And in the same way was not also Ra'hab the harlot justified by works when she received the messengers and sent them out another way? For as the body apart from the spirit is dead, so faith apart from works is dead (James 2:14-26).

The Catholic Doctrine of Merit: The "No Boasting" and "All Glory to God" Objections

Objection: If good works are in any way meritorious and necessary for salvation, then this would give those who are saved grounds to boast of their moral accomplishments having earned them their salvation, which would usurp the glory of God in the context of what is most important to man, namely his salvation. This is unacceptable. Hence, Paul teaches, “Then what becomes of our boasting? It is excluded. On what principle? On the principle of works? No, but on the principle of faith…What then shall we say about Abraham, our forefather according to the flesh? For if Abraham was justified by works, he has something to boast about, but not before God” (Romans 3:27; 4:1-2). Likewise, Paul teaches, “For by grace you have been saved through faith; and this is not your own doing, it is the gift of God—not because of works, lest any man should boast” (Ephesians 2:8-9, emphasis added). And if good works contribute to salvation and thereby give us grounds to boast, then God would be robbed of glory. As John MacArthur sums up, “You can’t earn your way into the kingdom. A works salvation system blasts the glory of God. Man becomes a usurper who boasts that he has earned his way to God” (Justification by Faith, pg. 80). God alone gets the glory for our salvation (and everything else, for that matter). As God says in Isaiah, “I am the Lord, that is my name; my glory I give to no other” (Isaiah 42:8). This is the doctrine of Soli Deo Gloria (glory to God alone). Therefore, good works cannot be necessary for salvation, nor can it be maintained that they make a contribution to justification. As John Calvin explains:

Successive Addition, Supertasks, Grim Reapers, and the Kalam Cosmological Argument

In the previous post, I considered William Lane Craig's first philosophical argument for the second premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument, viz. The universe began to exist. In this post, I want to consider Craig's second philosophical argument for this same premise. Additionally, I will consider the Grim Reaper Paradox and its application to proving this premise.

Hilbert's Hotel, Set Theory, Presentism, and the Kalam Cosmological Argument

The Kalam Cosmological Argument is an argument for the existence of God that is broken up into two stages. The first stage of the argument tries to show that the universe has a cause and can be formulated as follows:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

The second stage of the argument then attempts to derive various of the divine attributes from the cause of the universe, thus implying that the cause in question is plausibly taken to be God as classically conceived. Perhaps the most prominent defender of the Kalam today is the philosopher William Lane Craig. Craig typically offers two philosophical arguments in support of the second premise of the first stage of the argument (see the syllogism above). In this post, I want to examine Craig's first philosophical argument.

Presuppositionalism and Transcendental Arguments

A truly transcendental argument takes any fact of experience which it wishes to investigate, and tries to determine what the presuppositions of such a fact must be, in order to make it what it is — Cornelius Van Til

Presuppositionalists attempt, then, to argue transcendentally. That is, they argue that all meaning and thought—indeed, every fact—logically presupposes the God of the Scriptures — Steven B. Cowan

Our argument should be transcendental. That is, it should present the biblical God, not merely as the conclusion to an argument, but as the one who makes argument possible — John Frame

It is impossible for the same man to suppose at the same time that the same thing is and is not; for the man who made this error would entertain two contrary opinions at the same time. Hence all men who are demonstrating anything refer back to this as an ultimate belief; for it is by nature the starting-point of all the other axioms as well — Aristotle

The existence of outer things is required for the possibility of a determinate consciousness of the self — Immanuel Kant

If God is God, then God is. Now the antecedent is so true that it cannot be thought not to be. Therefore, it is true without doubt that God exists — St. Bonaventure

Presuppositional Apologetics: Reformed vs. Catholic Approaches

The cultural moment we now find ourselves in demands, possibly more than any other time in history, a potent and spirited renewal of apologetics in the Catholic Church — Matthew Nelson

Apologists may soon find themselves in a situation where much of the culture lacks even the bare minimum of common ground necessary for rational engagement — Edward Feser

Apologetics already acknowledges the truth of revelation, for one only defends what one thinks is certain — Fr. Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange

For how does one know that the thoughts that come to us in dreams are any more false than the others, given that they are often no less vivid and explicit? And even if the best minds study this as much as they please, I do not believe they can give any reason sufficient to remove this doubt, unless they presuppose the existence of God — René Descartes

The only proof for the existence of God is that without God you couldn't prove anything — Cornelius Van Til

Presuppositionalism is guilty of a logical howler: it commits the informal fallacy of petitio principii, or begging the question, for it advocates presupposing the truth of Christian theism in order to prove Christian theism — William Lane Craig

A Libertarian Case Against Abortion

In celebration of the overturning of Roe v. Wade, I thought I would share an (unpublished) essay I wrote against the moral permissibility of abortion a few years ago. At the time, I was somewhat of a libertarian (this is no longer the case). Consequently, I approached the issue through a libertarian lens. If there is an apologetic advantage to this, it is that pro-choice arguments are, I think, strongest when evaluated against a libertarian backdrop. Thus, the essay seeks to refute the pro-choice position on its home turf, so to speak. Anyway, without further ado, the essay can be accessed HERE.

The Catholic Doctrine of Merit: The Proverbial Bus and the Good Thief

Objection: It seems highly implausible that good works are necessary for salvation. Suppose, for instance, that someone is baptized and therefore brought into a state of salvation. Further, suppose that this person is then immediately hit by a bus and killed, without having had the opportunity to do any good works. If good works are necessary for salvation, then this person would be damned, which is absurd. After all, he was just saved through being baptized. Or what about an infant who is baptized and then dies due to health complications? The infant in such a case has not performed any good works. But surely that infant will be in Heaven. Finally, we can take an example from Sacred Scripture. The Good Thief on the cross next to Christ repented, and Jesus told him, “Truly, I say to you, today you will be with me in Paradise” (Luke 23:43). The Good Thief, therefore, was brought into a state of salvation, and Jesus assured him that he would be in Heaven. And clearly, he had not performed any (supernatural) good works at that point, and he would not have the opportunity to do so since he would soon die on the cross. For all of these reasons, therefore, it must not be the case that good works are necessary for salvation.

A Brief Argument on Infant Baptism

Some Protestants reject the legitimacy of infant baptism by holding that baptism, being an outward sign of salvation, must be received with full, conscious consent, and this is because salvation itself can only be received by making an explicit act of faith (which requires full, conscious consent), no exceptions. This view is referred to in certain Protestant circles as "believer's baptism." Since, therefore, infants are neither capable of giving full, conscious consent nor, a fortiori, making an explicit act of faith, it follows that infant baptism is invalid. The trouble with this reasoning, aside from the fact that baptism is not merely an outward sign but rather also the instrumental cause of salvation, is that it entails that infants cannot be saved, which is in utter contradiction to the teaching of Jesus (cf. Luke 18:15-16). The Protestant is here making two claims which logically entail the conclusion that salvation is impossible for infants:

1. An explicit act of faith is necessary for salvation.
2. Infants are not capable of making an explicit act of faith.
3. Therefore, infants cannot be saved.

Kant's First Antinomy: The Beginning of the Universe

The philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) famously argued that reason is not capable of answering the question of whether the universe began to exist. Kant sought to show this by demonstrating that both the proposition that the universe began to exist and its negation (i.e., the universe did not begin to exist) admit of incontrovertible arguments in their favor, thus implying that reason leads to the conclusion that a proposition (what Kant calls the “thesis”) and its negation (what Kant calls the “antithesis”) are both true. But by the principle of non-contradiction, a proposition and its negation cannot both be true. Kant refers to such paradoxes as antinomies of pure reason. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant identifies four such antinomies, the first of which is the one presently under discussion. In trying to answer such cosmological questions by way of pure reason, reason itself, as Kant puts it, “soon falls into such contradictions that it is constrained, in this cosmological field, to desist from any such pretensions” (Critique of Pure Reason, Bk. II, Ch. II, pg. 385). Given the present antinomy, we must conclude that reason itself is bankrupt with respect to answering the question of whether the universe began to exist, even though the question must of logical necessity have an objective answer. As Kant writes,

Quitting the Quintilemma: Eternal Security and Warnings of Falling Away: A Response to William Lane Craig

In a previous post (HERE), I presented an argument against the doctrine of eternal security in which I argued that, in order to avoid antinomianism while maintaining eternal security, a proponent of the doctrine of eternal security has four possible moves, none of which is ultimately acceptable: (i) Antinomianism; (ii) No true Christian (i.e., no person in the state of justification) has ever committed the sins listed in 1 Corinthians 6:9-10, Galatians 5:19-21, and Revelation 21:8; (iii) Antinomianism minus apostacy; (iv) Sacred Scripture contains numerous completely pointless warnings. This set up a quintilemma in which it was concluded that the doctrine of eternal security is false. Focusing on (iv), if the doctrine of eternal security is true, then it would seem that Scripture contains pointless warnings. For if a Christian cannot lose his salvation, then warnings about Christians losing their salvation are pointless.

The Ethics of Mockery

Two fundamental questions:

1. Is mockery ever morally permissible?
2. If yes, under what conditions?

In answer to the first question, we must answer with yes. For our Lord Himself engaged in mockery (cf. Matthew 23:24). Since, therefore, our Lord is utterly without sin (cf. Hebrews 4:15), it follows that mockery is not intrinsically sinful and therefore can be morally permissible.

Answering the second question is more difficult, but if we follow the example of our Lord, we can identify various conditions under which mockery is morally permissible. When Christ engaged in mockery, the chief reasons for doing so were to combat error and to teach truth. Christ engages in mockery in order to repudiate the hypocrisy of the scribes and Pharisees, and to teach the truth that the interior life is more important than the exterior (cf. Matthew 23:27-28). So, using mockery for these purposes is morally legitimate. Purposes for engaging in mockery that are obviously not morally legitimate would include, for example, wanting to calumniate someone or wanting to simply manifest cruelty by inflicting emotional pain on someone.

The Biblical Case for the Doctrine of Eternal Security: Arguments and Rebuttals

The doctrine of eternal security can be defined, according to the Westminster Confession, as follows:

They whom God hath accepted in his Beloved, effectually called and sanctified by his Spirit, can neither totally nor finally fall away from the state of grace; but shall certainly persevere therein to the end, and be eternally saved (Westminster Confession, XVII.I).

The basic thesis is that a Christian cannot lose his salvation. Once a person is justified, he is always justified. In my last post (HERE), I presented an argument against eternal security. In this post, I want to consider the biblical arguments for eternal security and to offer rebuttals to those arguments. In what follows, I will present passages of Sacred Scripture accompanied by arguments from the passages to the doctrine of eternal security as well as corresponding rebuttals to those arguments. I have attempted to be simultaneously comprehensive and concise. The scriptural passages are taken from the NIV translation. I have opted to use this translation because it is an Evangelical translation, which allows me to avoid the lame objection that I am using a translation with "Catholic bias."

An Anti-Antinomian Quintilemma Against the Doctrine of Eternal Security

A neuralgic point of contention between various traditions of Christianity is whether a Christian can lose his salvation. Among Protestants, Calvinists are especially associated with the doctrine of eternal security (alternatively, perseverance of the saints), which holds that no true Christian can lose his salvation, and this is because God will always preserve every Christian in a state of grace and continually and unconditionally forgive their sins. As the Westminster Confession states: